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Commercial Motor Vehicle
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Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks
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Division of Motor Carriers
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Department of Vehicle Regulation
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Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
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Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations

FOOS

Federal Out-of-Service
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Hazardous Materials Regulations
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Hazmat Out-of-Service
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Hi-Tech Solutions, Ltd.
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Interstate Common Carrier
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Inspection Identification
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International Fuel Tax Agreement
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International Registration Plan

ISSES

Integrated Safety and Security Enforcement System
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KATS

Kentucky Automated Truck Screening

KIT

Kentucky Intrastate Tax

KSP-CVE

Kentucky State Police-Commercial Vehicle Enforcement

KTC

Kentucky Transportation Center

KYTC

Kentucky Transportation Cabinet

KYU

Kentucky Highway Use

NCIC

National Crime Information Center

MCSAP

Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program

OCR

Optical Character Recognition

OOS

Out of Service

PARSS

Prism-based Automated Ramp Screening System

PRISM

Performance and Registration Information Systems Management

SAFER

Safety and Fitness Electronic Records

SMS

Safety Measurement System

UCR

Unified Carrier Registration

USDOT

United States Department of Transportation

USDOTR

United States Department of Transportation Number Reader

VOOS

Vehicle Out-of-Service

WIM

Weigh-In-Motion
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Executive Summary
In 2010, Kentucky implemented a Performance Registration Information Systems and
Management (PRISM) based automated ramp screening system (PARSS) at the Boone County
inspection station on southbound I-71. The purpose of the PARSS is to identify and screen every
vehicle that enters the Boone County inspection station. The system provides automated
screening of trucks based on the license plate number and the USDOT number displayed on the
vehicle. If it is determined that the vehicle should be stopped for inspection, that decision is
communicated to the truck driver via the existing directional arrows that direct drivers to the
static scale for inspection. The system installed at Boone County has the following components:










Two automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems (one from Perceptics and one from
Hi-Tech Solutions (HTS)) that provide the license plate number from the front of the
vehicle along with the state/jurisdiction. FMCSA’s PRISM team required the installation
of two different ALPRs for this project, to allow for a side-by-side comparison.
An automated USDOT number reader (USDOTR) (from HTS) that provides the USDOT
number from the side of the vehicle.
A scene camera (from Perceptics) to capture a digital image of each passing vehicle for
general description and visual identification purposes.
An interface to the existing weigh-in-motion (WIM) and truck sorting and tracking
system (Mettler-Toledo), which directs trucks targeted for inspection to park.
A screening database containing national and state information pertaining to safety,
registration, and credentials. The database is updated daily, using data from Kentucky’s
Clearinghouse and Commercial Vehicle Information Exchange Window (CVIEW).
Safety and Fitness Electronic Records (SAFER) provides (via Kentucky’s CVIEW) the
PRISM status and the Federal Out-of-Service (FOOS) status of the motor carrier.
The system is connected to a computer in the inspection station. An integrated user
interface (developed by Cadre5) allows enforcement personnel to observe the system
operation and to interact with the system as necessary.

As the vehicle enters the inspection station and progresses along the ramp, it is tracked using
loops in the pavement. Images of the vehicle and the vehicle’s weight are collected on the ramp,
and the identifying information is automatically decoded from the images and utilized with the
screening database. The PARSS checks several elements on the carrier and vehicle level to see
if any potential safety, registration, or credential problems exist. Only vehicles that fail the
screening test are directed (by the system) to stop.

ix

While the system is designed to operate automatically, it also allows for enforcement personnel
to monitor and interact with the system. Specifically, when ALPR/USDOT information is
displayed, enforcement personnel have the ability to check the optical character recognition
(OCR) results against photographs displayed on the user interface and make on-the-fly
corrections. If corrections are made on the user interface, the truck is rescreened based on the
corrected data.
A thorough evaluation was conducted to assess the performance of the system (i.e., does it do
what it was intended to do?), the value of the system in identifying vehicles for inspection with
PRISM or CVISN-related issues, and the potential for more widespread deployment of this type
of screening system. In addition, the evaluation also included a side-by-side comparison of the
two ALPR systems.
One of the key elements of the evaluation was the assessment of the optical character recognition
(OCR) of the license plate and USDOT number. Evaluators calculated an accuracy rate for each
piece of equipment. In order to take into account unique situations where the equipment would
not be expected to accurately decode the information, some fail codes were labeled as
“exceptions” and an adjusted accuracy rate was calculated. For the ALPR, these situations
included: the absence of a license plate or the obstruction of the license plate (e.g., a wide load
banner, etc.). For the USDOTR, these situations included any scenario where the posted
USDOT number did not meet the federal regulation. In addition, adjusted accuracy rates were
calculated for various weather and lighting conditions. Post evaluation, vendors were given the
opportunity to make improvements to their system and the adjusted accuracy rate was calculated
again.
ALPR/USDOT

Perceptics
78.7%
82.6%
80.3%
86.3%
85.6%
65.4%
85.2%

Accuracy
Adjusted Accuracy
Day, Clear Adjusted Accuracy
Night, Clear Adjusted Accuracy
Day, Rain Adjusted Accuracy
Day, Snow Adjusted Accuracy
Post Evaluation Adjusted Accuracy

HTS
71.8%
75.5%
74.1%
76.3%
80.0%
55.6%
88.7%

USDOT
73.7%
74.2%
75.4%
69.3%
76.5%
75.5%
76.0%

For the ALPRs, the most common understood reason for failure was due to license plates that
were dirty, damaged, bent, or lacked retroreflectivity. For the USDOTR, the most common
failure was that the USDOT number was not visible (or only partially visible) within the image.
The ALPRs performed best in “Night, Clear” and “Day, Rain” conditions. Accuracy rates for
the ALPR systems were significantly lower during “Day, Snow” conditions. The USDOTR
performed best during “Day, Rain” conditions and had significantly lower accuracy rates during
the “Night, Clear” conditions. During the evaluation, the Perceptics ALPR outperformed the
HTS ALPR in all conditions. After the evaluation, the HTS ALPR improved drastically and
outperformed the Perceptics ALPR.
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One significant problem that surfaced during the screening process was the quality of data used
to make screening decisions. Some of these problems originate during the data collection point,
some at the point in which Kentucky (and other states) send data to the national clearinghouses,
and in some cases when the data is pushed out to various servers used by individual states for
their commercial vehicle screening systems. In general, this problem is more significant on the
vehicle level than the carrier level. The result is that the system will fail some vehicles on a
particular screening element, only to have enforcement stop that vehicle and find there is no
problem.
With regard to the value of the system, during a 22-hour enforcement blitz, the screening system
computer flagged 326 vehicles as potential violators. Of those 326 trucks/drivers, 72 were
subjected to a Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3 inspection. The enforcement detail issued 49 citations
containing 65 charges, and found 62 safety violations. On an hourly basis, the system was
flagging roughly 15 vehicles and generating three to four inspections per hour. The enforcement
detail issued a citation, notice of safety violations, or both in 62 of 72 inspections.
The safety and compliance violations uncovered by the system were consequential. There were
62 safety violations, and 49 citations with 65 individual charges. As a result of the safety
violations, six vehicles and one driver were placed out-of-service. There were also two trucks
detained because of outstanding FOOS orders. The VOOS rate was 27.2 percent for the March 6
blitz, and 43.8 percent during an earlier safety blitz on January 23. The average VOOS rate for
the two blitzes was 34.2 percent, which is well above the national average. As a result of the
credentials and registration citations, $7,280 in fees, fines and back taxes were collected. Such
outcomes may not be reflective of what users and researchers should expect out of the system on
a daily basis. Staffing levels are not as high for daily operations as they are during special
enforcement details. However, the potential of the system to augment safety and compliance
screening performance outcomes is quite significant, particularly as the screening systems
proliferate to other inspection stations across Kentucky. Total collections at the Boone County
inspection station for calendar year 2011 were $20,628.87. So, it is obvious that the system has
the potential to significantly increase collections at Boone County and at any other inspection
stations where the system is implemented. Subsequent years have seen an increase in collections
as well ($29,620.73 in 2012 and $25,463.75 through September of 2013).
The safety benefits of roadside inspections are difficult to quantify, but FMCSA officials
estimated that 8,149 crashes, 5,206 injuries, and 276 lives were saved in FY2009 as a result of
roadside inspection programs around the country. A screening tool that provides a VOOS that,
when averaged, is 14 percent higher than the national average should substantially enhance these
safety benefits. Another benefit is more efficient enforcement. The data showed that, when using
this system, 65.8 percent of the Level 1 and 2 inspections identified safety violations.
The results demonstrate the system’s most basic benefit – an automated screening process for
virtually every truck passing through the station, with efficient identification of those carriers and
vehicles most likely to have safety and compliance problems. Ultimately, the system provides
tangible benefits to every stakeholder in the truck screening process. Enforcement officials reap
the benefits of a highly specialized, automated ramp screening system that employs the latest
technology and best available screening data. FMCSA benefits from enhanced safety screening.
The increased VOOS rates and automated identification of FOOS carriers are vital for keeping
unsafe carriers off the roads and preventing crashes, thus reducing the associated economic,
xi

environmental, and human damage. The KYTC benefit from safety, credentials, and registration
results, as the increased collections help bolster Kentucky’s Road Fund and pay for the state’s
various surface transportation needs. The trucking industry benefits from increased safety and
credentials compliance, as it reduces the number of non-compliant carriers and levels the playing
field for carriers who do follow the statutory and regulatory requirements.
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Chapter 1. Background and Introduction
Kentucky has 14 fixed inspection stations around the state for enforcement of size and weight,
safety, registration, and credentials related to commercial vehicles. These stations are typically
located on Kentucky’s interstates and parkways although two are on U.S. routes. The stations
are maintained by the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KYTC) and staffed by the Kentucky
State Police – Commercial Vehicle Enforcement (KSP-CVE) Division. In 2011, there were
more than 4.5 million trucks that passed through these stations. All of these trucks were
weighed, but only one percent of the trucks were inspected. Much of the weighing is done with
weigh-in-motion (WIM) equipment and can occur as the vehicle rolls through the station. The
inspections require an officer or inspector to stop the vehicle, perform the inspection, and
complete the appropriate paperwork. This typically takes anywhere from 30 minutes to 1 hour to
complete, but can take much longer. For this reason, along with limitations on the number of
staff available at the stations, only a small percentage of commercial vehicles can be inspected at
these locations. That is why it is critical that KSP-CVE be able to electronically screen vehicles
for inspection.

1.1 Kentucky’s Current Screening Processes
Kentucky utilizes mainline screening at 12 of their fixed stations. This type of screening,
however, is more about who is allowed to bypass rather than who is identified for inspection.
Kentucky initially ran its own transponder-based electronic screening system, but now utilizes
the PrePass system. Trucks who receive a “green light” are allowed to bypass on the mainline,
while trucks receiving a “red light” must pull into the inspection station. There is currently no
way to automatically stop these vehicles who have been given a red light by PrePass. An officer
or inspector would have to be monitoring the PrePass computer screen and manually stop these
trucks for inspection. Instead, these trucks are treated like every other truck once they enter the
station. Since not every vehicle has a transponder, this type of screening is voluntary; a carrier
must sign up and choose to participate in this program. As a result, only a small percentage of
trucks can be screened in this manner.
In order to screen all vehicles, a method must be considered that can identify all commercial
vehicles. The license plate and USDOT number are required to be displayed on all commercial
vehicles. The license plate must be displayed on the front of the tractor except for on intrastate,
single-unit vehicles. Kentucky allows these vehicles to display their license plate on the back of
the unit. The USDOT number must be displayed for all commercial vehicles operating in
Kentucky as described in 49 CFR §390.21. The identification number must be preceded by
“USDOT” and must:





appear on both sides of the tractor;
be in letters that contrast sharply in color with the background on which the letters are
placed;
be readily legible, during daylight hours, from a distance of 50 feet while the CMV is
stationary; and
be kept and maintained in a manner that retains the legibility required as described above.
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In the past, Kentucky’s fixed inspection stations relied on having a human observer available to
read the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT) number from the side of the
vehicle for screening purposes. A person would enter the USDOT number into the computer to
determine if the carrier had any outstanding safety, registration, or credentials issues. (These
vehicles would also be screened using their weight data.) Due to staffing shortages, there are
many times and many locations where no one is available to consistently perform this duty. As a
result, a large percentage of trucks pass through Kentucky inspection stations without being
screened against information provided by KYTC and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA). Even when enforcement personnel are present to read and enter
USDOT numbers, it is a challenging task to read these numbers from a moving vehicle. At some
inspection stations in Kentucky, there is a static scale lane between the enforcement personnel
and the stream of trucks, thus making the task even more difficult. If a truck is on the static scale,
it blocks the view of the passing trucks so that no USDOT numbers can be read.
Manually screening the trucks as they pass the inspection station also makes it extremely
difficult to identify the truck, make a decision, and signal the truck to stop before it heads back to
the highway. If the truck is to be stopped, decisions and actions must be immediate. As a result,
there are many occasions where enforcement personnel decide to stop a truck, but are unable to
do so before the truck exits the station. Because of these issues, an automated way to identify
vehicles approaching the inspection station is needed.
Kentucky first evaluated automatic license plate readers (ALPR) and USDOT number readers
(USDOTR) with the implementation of the Integrated Safety and Security Enforcement System
(ISSES) in 2005. This system was primarily a radiation detection system but included ALPR
and USDOTR to identify the vehicles. These technologies showed great promise for automating
the identification process. However, these systems were never interfaced with any databases, so
although they were capturing and decoding the license plate or USDOT numbers, ISSES was
still unable to identify the vehicle. Also, the ISSES equipment was located within 100 feet of the
inspection station, so even if Kentucky chose to interface the system with the appropriate
databases, it would be unlikely that the vehicle could be identified and stopped prior to exiting
the station. It became clear that an automated system within the inspection station was needed to
efficiently identify and screen vehicles for inspection.

1.2 Kentucky’s Screening Criteria
In 1999, Kentucky entered into a grant agreement with the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) for the implementation of the Performance and Registration Information Systems
Management (PRISM) program in Kentucky. PRISM links federal and state motor carrier safety
information systems with the motor vehicle registration and licensing systems of the states. The
PRISM program has two primary objectives: 1) determine the safety fitness of the motor carrier
prior to issuing license plates, and 2) cause motor carriers to improve their safety performance
through an improvement process. In cases where a carrier does not improve safety, the
application of sanctions may be necessary. A key requirement for enforcement in PRISM states,
like Kentucky, is to identify carriers and vehicles operating under a Federal Out-of-Service
(FOOS) order and to identify those targeted by FMCSA for inspection. Motor carriers with an
FOOS order must cease interstate operations generally due to one of the following conditions:
1) The motor carrier received a final unsatisfactory rating from FMCSA;
2) After due process, the motor carrier fails to pay Federal fines levied from FMCSA;
2

3) The motor carrier is determined to be an imminent hazard; or
4) A new entrant fails an audit or does not schedule one within 18 months.
Those targeted for inspection are considered high-risk for a future crash as determined by the
Safety Measurement System (SMS), which is the primary component of the Compliance, Safety,
Accountability (CSA) program that was introduced in 2010.
KSP-CVE also strives to enforce other commercial vehicle-related size and weight, safety,
registration, and credentials regulations. All oversize and overweight loads are directed to the
static scale and typically must show a permit before exiting the station. With regard to safety,
KSP-CVE uses the company’s safety history from the Safety and Fitness Electronic Records
(SAFER) database as an indicator of a potential safety problem. Carriers with an unusually high
vehicle, driver, or hazardous material out-of-service (OOS) rate are good candidates for
inspection. Registration and credentials information is taken from a variety of national and
Kentucky databases including Kentucky’s Commercial Vehicle Information Exchange Window
(CVIEW). Using these sources of information, KSP-CVE can determine if the following
registration or credentials problems exist:









Vehicle has expired registration;
Vehicle is not prorated for Kentucky;
Vehicle exceeds its registered weight;
Carrier has a revoked International Fuel Tax Agreement (IFTA) (from any state) or a
suspended IFTA from Kentucky;
Carrier has a revoked or suspended Interstate Common Carrier (ICC) Exempt certificate;
Carrier has insufficient liability insurance;
Carrier has not paid previous and/or current year Unified Carrier Registration (UCR); and
Carrier does not have the appropriate Kentucky-specific credential or has one that has
been revoked or suspended, such as the Kentucky Intrastate Tax (KIT), KY for Hire, or
the Kentucky Highway Use (KYU).

In 2010, Kentucky utilized PRISM and Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks
(CVISN) federal grants to implement an automated ramp screening system at the Boone County
inspection station. The PRISM program is a federal program administered by the FMCSA and is
designed to improve the safety performance of carriers by targeting high-risk carriers for
roadside inspections and potential sanctions if the company’s safety record does not improve.1
The primary source of funding was PRISM and therefore the system became known as a
PRISM-based Automated Ramp Screening System (PARSS). However, the system incorporated
all the PRISM and CVISN screening elements described in the previous paragraphs. The
Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) at the University of Kentucky was tasked with
developing the system specifications, procuring the equipment and user interface software,
overseeing the installation and construction of the system, working through technical issues,
evaluating the performance of the system and the technologies, and developing criteria for wide

1

FMCSA. 2013. “Performance and Registration Information Systems Management (PRISM) – Background.”
Accessed 30 May 2013 at: https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safety-security/prism/prism.aspx
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spread deployment of the system to other stations in Kentucky. FMCSA’s PRISM team required
that the system include a USDOTR and at least two ALPRs. Both ALPRs would be utilized to
capture the tractor plate on the front of the vehicle and the evaluation would need to include a
comparison of the two ALPR systems. From KYTC and KSP-CVE’s perspective, the system
would hopefully address the screening challenges posed by staff shortages and time constraints
at the Boone County inspection station.

1.3 Content of the Report
A description of the system, the findings of the evaluation, and lessons learned from the project
are summarized in this report and organized as follows:


Chapter 2 includes a description of the system, when it was installed, maintenance
requirements, site layout, system architecture, the system sequence, information about the
screening data, the maintenance of the screening data and a description of the system’s
utilization protocol.



Chapter 3 details the evaluation of the system, and includes an analysis of how well the
system performed during various tasks. Researchers looked at whether the system
captured images on every truck passing through the station, whether it properly decoded
the license plate and USDOT number in the images, whether it correlated the data
correctly for every commercial vehicle (i.e. links license plate, USDOT number and
weight data), whether it screened against the appropriate database and returned the
expected result, whether it characterized problems correctly, how often manual
corrections needed to be made to the USDOT number, license plate number, or
jurisdiction, the quality and usefulness of the user interface, proper integration with the
inspection station signage and how the system stored observations for audit purposes.
Chapter 3 also provides a side-by-side comparison of ALPR cameras, includes a
description of the different specifications for the two camera systems, compares the
effectiveness of each system in capturing the full license plate image for each commercial
vehicle, the percentage of properly decoded character strings for each commercial vehicle
license plate or USDOT decal, and the percentage of vehicles for which the correct
jurisdiction is also identified.



Chapter 4 details another component of the system evaluation and includes an
examination of the potential safety violation code outputs to analyze the benefits of the
system for commercial vehicle safety and enforcement. The safety benefits from
identifying carriers with a FOOS order, carriers in the PRISM target file or targeted for
safety inspections, and trucks with high vehicle-out-of-service (VOOS) and driver-out-ofservice (DOOS) records. These warning “flags” were examined closely over three days
of enforcement blitzes. During the blitzes, the level of inspection (Level 1, 2, or 3) and
the final disposition of the stop were recorded to assess the effectiveness of particular
safety flags.

4



Chapter 5 delineates standards for widespread deployment developed based on the
observations of researchers and officials during the development of the initial automated
screening system at Boone County. These standards will address required staffing,
inspection station characteristics (such as ramp length, location, static scale location,
WIM attributes, etc.), the speed at which commercial vehicles bypass the station,
equipment needs and maintenance requirements/costs. This chapter also includes lessons
learned from the implementation and evaluation of this project.

5
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Chapter 2. System Description
This project involved the specification, installation, integration, operation, and support of an
automated PRISM-based screening system on the entrance ramp to the Boone County inspection
station. The system was implemented by a committee comprised of officials with KSP-CVE, the
Department of Vehicle Regulation (DVR), and Division of Motor Carriers (DMC). The installed
system has the following components:










Two ALPR systems (one from Perceptics and one from Hi-Tech Solutions (HTS)) that
provide the license plate number along with the state/jurisdiction from the front of the
vehicle. FMCSA’s PRISM team required the installation of two different ALPR systems
for this project, to allow for a side-by-side comparison.
An automated USDOT number reader from HTS that provides the USDOT number from
the side of the vehicle.
A scene camera (from Perceptics) to capture a digital image of each passing vehicle for
general description and visual identification purposes.
An interface to the existing WIM and truck sorting and tracking system (from MettlerToledo), which directs trucks targeted for inspection to park.
An automated screening database. The database is updated daily, using data from
Kentucky’s Clearinghouse and CVIEW systems that contain the PRISM Target File.
SAFER provides (via Kentucky’s CVIEW) the PRISM status and FOOS status of the
motor carrier. The PRISM Target File provides the list of vehicles targeted for corrective
action by the PRISM program. Kentucky’s CVIEW is updated every ten minutes from
SAFER.
The system is connected to a computer in the inspection station. An integrated user
interface allows enforcement personnel to observe the system operation and to interact
with the system as necessary.

The system provides automated screening of trucks based on the license plate number and the
USDOT number displayed on the vehicle. This automated screening checks the PRISM status of
the carrier and vehicle and also checks to see if a FOOS order has been issued against the carrier.
Safety history, credentials, and registration checks are also performed simultaneously. If it is
determined that the vehicle should be stopped for inspection, that decision is communicated to
the truck driver via the existing directional arrows that direct drivers to the static scale or to park
and come in for inspection. This ensures that PRISM-targeted carriers and vehicles are not only
identified, but are actually stopped for inspection.
Trucks are screened against a local database that resides on a computer in the inspection station.
While the system is designed to operate automatically, without the need for human intervention,
it also allows enforcement personnel to monitor and interact with the system. Specifically, when
license plate and USDOT number information is displayed, enforcement personnel have the
ability to check the optical character recognition (OCR) results against photographs displayed on
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the user interface and make on-the-fly corrections. If corrections are made on the user interface,
the truck is rescreened based on the corrected data. The system is installed far enough back on
the inspection station ramp to allow sufficient time for identification data to be displayed,
reviewed, and corrected before the automated screening decision is made and communicated to
the driver of the truck through the directional arrows of the existing truck sorting system.

2.1 Boone County Inspection Station
The system was installed at the Boone County inspection station which is located at the
southbound 75 mile marker of I-71. The station is classified as a “superstation” because the
station has a ramp WIM scale and sorting system, a large static scale capable of weighing the
entire truck at once, and a truck rest haven with restrooms and vending. The inspection station
faces oncoming traffic, with the bypass lane running between the station and the mainline, and
the static scale lane on the opposite side as shown in Figure 1. This inspection station is typically
open from 8:30 AM to 3:30 PM, Monday through Friday, and staffed by one to two officers
although staffing shortages have had an impact on their ability to open the station. The Annual
Average Daily Traffic (AADT) on I-71 southbound for 2012 was 16,763 vehicles per day, with
roughly 29 percent commercial vehicle traffic. In 2011, Boone County had 221,939 trucks come
through the inspection station and collected $20,628.87 in revenue from impounds. During 2011,
there were 1,347 Level 1, 2, and 3 inspections conducted, with 645 (47.9 percent) of those
inspections resulting in one or more violations. There were 6,744 commercial vehicle manual
observations at the station, where a human observer keyed in the USDOT number and screened
the vehicle against the Kentucky Clearinghouse. In 2011, KSP-CVE officials at Boone County
collected $2,925 in temporary permit sales through the DMC.
Figure 1. Overview of the Boone County Inspection Station

Static Scale Lane

Bypass Lane
Inspection
Station

(Image Source: Google Earth October-2011)
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In addition to the automated ramp screening system, the Boone County inspection station is
equipped with the PrePass mainline screening system. Boone County and the Laurel County
Northbound station on I-75 are the only inspection stations that are currently using this type of
screening system on the ramp to automatically check PRISM status, FOOS orders, and Kentucky
CVIEW records for safety, credentials, and weight violations.

2.2 Installation and Layout
The PARSS is comprised of two different image processing systems that work in unison to
screen the commercial vehicles as they enter the ramp to the inspection station. One system is
manufactured by Perceptics, LLC and the other system is produced by HTS. The Perceptics
system consists of an ALPR and an overhead scene camera. The HTS system is comprised of an
automatic USDOTR and an ALPR. A temporary installation of the Perceptics equipment was
completed late July 2010. Construction delays necessitated that the equipment be removed until
power and communication services were provided. The permanent installation of the Perceptics
system occurred during the last week of October 2010. Installation of the HTS equipment was
delayed due to the Wireless Roadside Inspection System study that was performed in
conjunction with FMCSA at the Boone County station. Initial installation of the equipment
began in February of 2011, but the system wasn’t accepted until September 2011. At the time,
HTS was new to this application for their camera equipment. Additional time was required to
ensure their equipment met the requirements of the project.
Figure 2 is a diagram of the Boone County inspection station and the sorting and tracking
system. The sorting and tracking system uses overhead signage to direct trucks at several critical
points. The in-ground inductive loops, which are buried in the traffic lanes, trigger various pieces
of equipment when trucks cross over them. These inductive loops are powered by the detector
and this creates a magnetic field. The loops resonate at a constant frequency, which is monitored
by the detector device. When a vehicle crosses over the loop, the resonating frequency changes
from the base frequency to an increased frequency, and lets the system know that a vehicle is
present.2

2

Marsh Products. 2000. “The Basics of Loop Vehicle Detection.” Accessed 2 April 2012 at:
http://www.marshproducts.com/pdf/Inductive%20Loop%20Write%20up.pdf
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Figure 2. Diagram of Boone County Inspection Station (Not to Scale)

WIM Scale

2.3 System Components
The primary system components of interest include the Mettler-Toledo WIM scale and truck
sorting system, Perceptics ALPR cameras and scene camera, HTS ALPR cameras and USDOTR,
a desktop computer system, and screening software developed by Cadre5, LLC.
2.3.1 Mettler-Toledo WIM System

The Mettler-Toledo WIM system incorporates dual staggered weight sensors in the roadway and
can accurately sense and weigh all vehicles entering the station. A calibration routine ensures the
WIM accuracy by comparing static weights of randomly or purposely selected trucks to WIM
results and automatically making needed adjustments. The vehicle speed, axle configuration, as
well as individual wheel, axle, and gross weights are measured by the system. The system can
deliver this data to a local or remote data system for reporting, data analysis, and integration with
other information systems.3 Figure 3 shows a truck about to cross the ramp WIM at the station.

3

Mettler -Toledo. “WIM (Weigh in Motion) Systems.” Accessed 2 May 2013 at:
http://us.mt.com/us/en/home/products/Industrial_Weighing_Solutions/terminals_indicators/Term_And_Indicato
rs_Vehicle_Weighing/WIM_Industrial_Terminal.html
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Figure 3. Truck at the Ramp WIM

2.3.2 Perceptics ALPR System

The Perceptics ALPR cameras capture license plates on the front of the vehicles. The system
includes an inductive loop, which activates or triggers the system, a stroboscopic illuminator, a
network video processor, and a scene camera. The power and Ethernet connections were
provided by KYTC, as was the computer and software which makes use of the data collected by
the system. Figure 4 shows the Perceptics equipment on the ramp at the Boone County
inspection station. Table 1 details the equipment information for the cameras and stroboscopic
illuminator.
Figure 4. Perceptics ALPR System

Scene

Stroboscopic
Illuminator

ALPR
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Table 1. Perceptics ALPR System
Device

Model

QTY

ALPR camera

IMG031

2

Scene camera

IMG030

1

Stroboscopic illuminator

IL003

1

2.3.3 HTS ALPR and USDOTR System

The HTS system, also known as the SeeUSDOT3 system, provides an additional set of ALPR
cameras and a USDOTR camera. In the HTS system, the cameras are mounted on two separate
polls on either side of the ramp, and the stroboscopic illuminators are contained in the same
housing as the cameras for the ALPR system. Table 2 details the model number for the ALPR
and USDOT cameras. Figure 5 displays an image of the system as mounted on the ramp and a
close-up of an ALPR camera.
Table 2. HTS ALPR and USDOTR System
Device

Model

QTY

ALPR camera

2809225M20J

2

USDOT camera

29B&W412J200X

2

Figure 5. HTS USDOT, ALPR Camera Systems

USDOTR

ALPR
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The SeeUSDOT3 Dual Pole ALPR reader is a turnkey system operating on a single lane, and
includes the following elements:












Two USDOT imaging units encapsulating one megapixel, black & white, gigabit
Ethernet cameras (GigE) cameras with White LED lighting – For capturing the USDOT
codes located on the sides of the commercial motor vehicle. GigE cameras can transfer
information at the rate of one gigabit per second.
Two ALPR cameras with integrated illumination – Used for viewing the front license
plates. Illumination Options include: Infrared or Visible.
Lane PC running Microsoft Windows 7 Pro – for running the HTS software.
Software security dongle (HASP HL PRO) – for software security.
Two Network Interface Cards– Allows communication with the GigE cameras.
Input/Output Module – For the systems’ input and output.
Two ground loop controllers – For detecting the truck’s position and speed.
Digital Input/Output module to convert ground loop signals to TCP/IP communications
protocol
TCP/IP communications protocol link (Network port) – For outputting the results via the
network.
Computer cabinet/computer rack – For housing the lane computer.

The SeeUSDOT3 system also includes the following software components:





SeeUSDOT3 – The main application.
SeeUSDOTViewer – The database viewer application.
Recognition DLLs – For recognizing the license plate and state jurisdiction.
Local MS-SQL database – For storing the recognition results.

2.3.4 Screening Computer and Software

The screening computer located inside the weigh station is a Dell workstation with a 24 inch
monitor. Table 3 outlines the specifications of the screening computer. The system is equipped
with an APC Smart-UPS power backup to prevent interruptions to the power supply. The
Kentucky PRISM screening software, which was written by Cadre5, is a web-based application
that is accessed through the screening computer. The software allows remote access for approved
users, and generates reports that are regularly distributed to members. These reports will be
detailed in section 2.5.4.
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Table 3. Screening System Computer Specifications
Component

Description

Model

Dell Precision T7500 Workstation

Processor

Dual Quad Core Intel Xeon Processors E5506 2.13GHz,4M L3, 4.8GT/s

RAM

6GB, 1066MHz, DDR3 SDRAM, ECC (6 DIMMS)

Hard Drive

500GB SATA 3.0Gb/s with NCQ and 16MB DataBurst Cache

Operating
System

Windows® 7 Professional, No Media, 64-bit, English

2.4 Sequence of Screening Events
The following steps detail how the screening system screens and sorts the trucks. References are
made to Figure 2 (station diagram) and Figure 6 (system architecture) when explaining the
system sequence of events and functionality. The steps below correspond to the numbers
displayed in Figure 6.
1. As the truck approaches the station, the first loop (1A in Figure 2 and Figure 6) initiates
the Mettler-Toledo system sorting system. When initiated, this system begins tracking the
vehicle with its own internal tracking algorithm.
2. When the commercial vehicle crosses loop 1B (see Figure 2 and Figure 6), it activates the
Perceptics scene and ALPR cameras. The scene camera provides an overhead picture for
general description and visual identification of the commercial vehicle. This image is sent
to the screening computer as soon as it is captured. The ALPR cameras provide two
pictures of the commercial vehicle’s license plate, which is then decoded by the system’s
OCR technology. The license plate photos, OCR result, and confidence level (which
measures how confident the system is that the image was successfully decoded based on
the external parameters in the system) are all transmitted to the screening computer in the
inspection station after the decode is completed (see Figure 6).
3. Upon receiving data from the Perceptics cameras, the screening computer creates a
unique identification number (ID), which is used to correlate data between the PARSS
and Mettler-Toledo system, and then sends this unique identifier to the Mettler-Toledo
system (see Figure 6).
4. When the commercial vehicle crosses loop 1C (see Figure 2 and Figure 6), it initiates the
HTS ALPR cameras. The cameras capture an image of the commercial vehicle’s license
plate from each side of the ramp and decodes them using OCR technology. Although two
images are captured, only one image is selected by the system and gets sent to the
screening computer. The loop also initiates the USDOTR cameras.
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5. When the commercial vehicle crosses loop 1D (see Figure 2 and Figure 6), the HTS
USDOTR cameras capture images of the USDOT number from both sides of the ramp.
The USDOT number is typically displayed in the form of a decal or painted on the sides
of the truck cab. The characters from the USDOT number are also decoded with OCR
technology. Even though multiple images are captured by the USDOTR cameras, only
one USDOT number image is selected and sent to the screening computer.
6. The HTS ALPR and USDOTR images, character strings, and confidence levels are
packaged together and transmitted to the screening computer. This information is
correlated with the ALPR and Scene Camera images from Perceptics and the weight data
from Mettler-Toledo.
7. As the truck crosses the WIM scale (see Figure 2), the WIM system computes the gross
vehicle weight, total vehicle length, number of axles, individual axle weights, and
individual axle spacing. It stamps the date and time, affixes a system tracking number and
any weight violation before sending the information to the screening computer.
8. The screening computer compiles all of the data from the camera systems and WIM
system into a single transaction record, and screens a local database (which is updated
nightly) to determine whether there are any potential safety or credential violations for
the particular carrier or vehicle. Since the screening computer receives two different
license plate decodes, the one with the highest confidence level is used for screening. The
KYU number, which is displayed on the side of the truck, can also be entered manually if
it is visible in the photograph of the USDOT number. The potential screening violations
are flagged and displayed on the screening computer graphical user interface.
Enforcement personnel have an opportunity to make corrections (if needed) to the OCR
results for the license plate or USDOT number. If changes are entered based on the
user’s recognition of an OCR error, the system rescreens the carrier or vehicle on the
manually entered license plate number or USDOT number. The screening results yield
the user one of four colored designations. Green signifies the vehicle and/or carrier is in
good standing. Blue indicates a warning, which means there is no data against which to
screen the particular truck, that the truck is registered to a state whose data is not trusted,
or the system does not have a high enough confidence level in the screening results to
notify the scale sorting system. Yellow means a screening violation has occurred but the
enforcement personnel have chosen not to screen for that particular violation at that time.
Red means a screening violation has occurred for an item the enforcement personnel have
chosen to screen on at that particular time. When red is displayed, the scale sorting
system is notified to direct the suspected violator to the static scale. The color
designations are also represented in Table 5.
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9. The screening system computer communicates a sort decision to the Mettler-Toledo
system that directs the truck to the bypass lane or the static scale depending on the
screening results. If the vehicle transaction record turns up a violation flag (red) before
the split in the ramp for the static scale and bypass lane (22 on Figure 2), the vehicle is
sent to the static scale so KSP-CVE personnel can investigate the problem further. If the
screening produces a potential violation after a truck passes the split in the ramp, the
truck is identified as a violator in the bypass lane, and can be directed to park from the
bypass lane by the Mettler-Toledo system. KSP-CVE personnel still have the option to
inspect trucks not flagged by PARSS and can hit the park button attached to the WIM
system computer to park a truck that is in the bypass lane. If no violation flag is found,
the truck is sorted to the bypass lane.
10. The WIM system updates the station signage, which indicates that a driver is to bypass,
go to the static scale or park (depending on the location of the signage – see the graphic
representations in Figure 2). The WIM system tracks the vehicle to ensure the driver
follows the signage commands. For example, a truck directed to the static scale would
have the following loop sequence after going through the initial screening and WIM
sensors: 22-3-5-9-24-23-14. If a truck is directed to the static scale but stays in the bypass
lane, the sequence would be: 22-4-21-15. The WIM system would send an audible
message to KSP-CVE personnel indicating a violator is in the bypass lane when the truck
activates loop 4. The truck is directed to park when loop 15 is activated (see Figure 2).
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Figure 6. PARSS Architecture and Sequence
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2.5 PARSS User Interface
The following section describes the PARSS software and user interface. Several components of
the software are discussed, including an overview of the main user interface, truck listing, the
truck listing components, navigation controls, filtering options, search function, dashboard,
inspection details, system settings, and administrative features. The software was developed by
Cadre5 LLC and is browser-based and operated by double-clicking a shortcut on the screening
computer desktop screen.
2.5.1 Navigation

Figure 7 is a screenshot of Kentucky’s PARSS user interface. There are four primary
components that users need to understand in order to effectively use the system: Navigation,
Filtering, Truck Listing, and Truck Details. Navigation is accomplished via the Go To button at
the top left of the page. When clicked, a menu is presented with each of the available pages that
may be accessed. Clicking an option in the menu will navigate the browser to that page.
Table 4 displays the various options available under the navigation menu. The default screen is
the Live View screen, which shows the details for live inspections of trucks being screened by the
PARSS. Search provides a way for the user to access historical inspections as questions arise
about the screening outcome. The Dashboard screen provides information on CVIEW updates,
device status, and reports. Users who wish to tweak the screening levels and criteria can do so
with the Levels screen. Administrative settings can be adjusted on the Admin screen.
Figure 7. Kentucky PARSS Software
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Table 4. Navigation Options
Option

Details

Live View

Main view for live inspections

Search

Search page for historical inspections

Dashboard Provides information on CVIEW updates, device status, and reports
Levels

Configuration page for setting screening levels

Admin

Provides some administrative options

2.5.2. Filtering

The filter tool is used to filter the Truck Listing of current and incoming inspections, and has
four main components: the Play/Pause button, time range selector, image type selector, and
screening result filter. The first component is the Play/Pause button. It is used to pause or resume
the flow of inspections coming into the Truck Listing. When paused, the browser will receive
inspections from the server, but will cache them until the flow is resumed to ensure that no
inspections are missed. Also, when paused, the button will flash as a reminder that the user
interface is in a paused state. The next component is the time range selector, and it determines
the length of time that inspections will remain in the Truck Listing before they are removed. This
value is also utilized when the page is loaded or refreshed so that inspections that have been
updated within the specified time will be populated in the Truck Listing. The third component is
the image type selector, and it determines which image type is given display priority in the Truck
Listing. The choices are to give priority to the license plate image or the truck (i.e. scene) image.
This will change the view of inspections already in the listing as well as new incoming
inspections. The final component is the screening result filter, and it determines which
inspections are displayed in the Truck Listing at any given time.
Changing the selection will update what inspections are shown in the list presently, as well as
which new inspections are shown. Table 5 details what each selection means. Choosing ALL
means all inspections will be listed. Choosing WARN means all inspections not given a “PASS”
by the system will be displayed. Choosing FAULT will display only those inspections with a
“FAULT” or “FAIL” tag. Choosing FAIL will only display those vehicles with a “FAIL” tag.
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Table 5. Filter Selections

Selection
ALL
WARN
FAULT
FAIL

2.5.3 Search

The search feature allows users to search for historical inspections. This function can be accessed
by utilizing the navigation menu and selecting Search. The search page is similar to the main
user interface, or Live View page, although there are a few distinctions:
1) New or live inspections will not flow into this view. Only historical data will be
displayed.
2) The search filter box is present.
3) The Filter does not include the Play/Pause selector, as it would not serve a purpose on a
screen without live data flow.
To search, use the search filter box in the upper right portion of the screen. Two options are
presented (1) a search by date and time range, or (2) a search for a specific inspection
identification number (ID). These two options may not be used simultaneously, and the second
option will take precedence if both inputs are completed. When searching with a date and time
range, the user may use a pop-up editor or manually enter the date and time range. Manual
entries must adhere to the formatting requirements of the cell. When searching for a specific
inspection, the ID of the inspection must be entered into the appropriate box. Clicking the Search
button populates the Truck Listing on the left side of the screen.
2.5.4 Dashboard

The dashboard provides information on CVIEW updates, device status, and reports. It may be
accessed by utilizing the navigation menu and selecting Dashboard.
For each type of CVIEW file installed on the server, a corresponding entry is shown in the
CVIEW Status section. The name of each file, along with details about the most recent time it
ran, is shown. Details include the file name, date, time it was processed, the result of processing
(success or failure), how many records were available to process, and a message about how
many records were processed and how long it took.
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For each component installed in the system, a corresponding entry is shown in the Device Status
section. Information about each component is displayed, including its current connection status,
time of the last communication with the device, and finally the time of the last observation
generated from the device.
The Reports section provides details about the reports generated by the system. Currently, there
are four reports that are set to run automatically. These reports are the daily report, daily vehicle
report, device report, and the observation report. These reports are emailed to those wishing to
receive regularly copies of the reports. Specific reports for KSP-CVE personnel can also be built
based on their needs. For each report, the report title is shown, in addition to the last date and
time that the report was run, and a link to view the last report.
The daily vehicle report lists all trucks identified with potential violations, the violation, and the
inspection ID that can be used to look up the truck in the system and verify the screening results.
The device report runs daily and shows the status of each piece of equipment located on the ramp
along with the last observation and last communication with that piece of equipment. This report
is useful in troubleshooting problems with the system. The daily report also runs daily and shows
a summary for the previous 24 hours, 7 days, and 30 days. The report summarizes the number of
inspections along with the number of potential violators under each screening criterion. This
allows users to see how many trucks with particular types of violations are coming through the
inspection station and whether or not they are coming through during certain hours, such as after
the station is closed. The CVIEW update status report runs daily and shows whether or not the
information from the Kentucky CVIEW was successfully uploaded to the screening system
database. This allows users to know if they are screening against stale data or not. It should be
noted that these reports are often unfiltered readouts that do not account for incorrect license
plate and USDOT number decodes. These corrections depend on the availability of KSP-CVE
officials to interact with the system, which is not always feasible due to staffing levels and the
high volume of trucks being identified by the screening system. The observation report runs
weekly and consists of observations recorded by the PARSS that are pushed to a server at the
KTC. These observations are used by the DVR to see the activity at the Boone County inspection
station.
2.5.5 Screening Levels Configuration

The screening levels configuration screen provides users with the ability to adjust screening
levels for various screening criteria by adjusting system algorithms. It can be accessed by
utilizing the navigation menu and selecting Levels. The values selected tell the system what
screening level result to apply to a given inspection. There are three screening level choices that
can be made: All, None or Percentage. Here is how those choices work:
1) All means that for a screening rule where Pull Over All is selected, each inspection found
to be in violation of this screening rule will be assigned a status of FAIL, and the sorting
system will be requested to sort this truck to the static scale.
2) None means if Pull Over None was selected for that same screening rule, and a violation
occurred, a status of FAULT would be assigned, and no request would be sent to the
sorting system.
3) Percentage means if Pull Over Percentage was selected, and 50 was entered into the text
box, then 50 percent of the trucks with violations would be assigned a status of FAIL, and
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a request sent to the sorting system, and 50 percent of the trucks with violations would be
assigned a status of FAULT, with no request sent to the sorting system.
These options are available for each of the system’s 17 screening criteria. At the top of the
screen, two quick override options are provided — (1) Pull Over All and (2) Pull Over None.
Selecting one of the override options bypasses the selections made at the per-screening rule
level. These are useful for quickly and easily dictating how many or which vehicles the PARSS
sends to the static scale.
Table 6 provides a listing of the available screening rules and their description. The first column
designates the screening rule, or specific criterion of interest. The second column, labeled
Description, designates the relevant screening question the corresponding screening criterion
attempts to answer. The third column, or Basis column, designates whether information from the
USDOTR or ALPR is used to make a particular screening decision. According to the chart, 13 of
the 17 criteria are screened based on the USDOT number, which is designated for carrier-level
information. The four remaining criteria use ALPR data, which enables vehicle-specific
screening.
Table 7 reports the data source for each screening criterion used by the screening system. Most
of the screening data comes from SAFER which is maintained by FMCSA. The rest of the data
generally comes from the Kentucky Clearinghouse system, with the exception of the IFTA data.
These processes can be somewhat complex and distinct even if the data ultimately comes from
the same source. For the sake of simplicity, only basic data sources are listed here.
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Table 6. System Screening Rules
Screening Rule

Description

Basis

All OOS Percentage

All OOS is the highest of Driver, Vehicle, or Hazmat
OOS scores. Does this USDOT number exceed the All
OOS Percentage threshold of 75 percent?

USDOT

Driver OOS
Percentage

Are the drivers for this USDOT number placed out of
service more than 15 percent of the time which is
almost 3 times the national average?

USDOT

Vehicle OOS
Percentage

Are the vehicles for this USDOT number placed out of
service more than 75 percent of the time which is over
3 times greater than the national average of 20
percent?

USDOT

Federal OOS

Does this USDOT number have a MCSIP level which is
Federal Out of Service? MCSIP levels 54-63

USDOT

Hazmat OOS
Percentage

Does the company associated with this USDOT
number get placed out of service more than 75 percent
of the time which is 15 times greater than the national
average of 4.5 percent? Set very high because the
system cannot differentiate a hazmat from a nonhazmat load.

USDOT

Liability Insurance

Does this USDOT number have a record of sufficient
liability insurance?

USDOT

UCR

Does this USDOT number have an unpaid previous or
current year UCR?

USDOT

Safety Rating

Does this USDOT number have an unsatisfactory
safety rating?

USDOT

KIT

Has the KIT status been suspended or revoked?

USDOT

KY HIRE

Does this USDOT number have a KY HIRE status of
inactive?

USDOT

KYU

Is there an active KYU status, or has it been
suspended or revoked?

USDOT

IFTA

Is there an active IFTA status, or if it is a Kentucky
carrier, has it been suspended or revoked?

USDOT

ICC Exempt

Is there an active ICC Exempt status, or has it been
suspended or revoked?

USDOT

PRISM

Is this License Plate in the PRISM and targeted for
roadside inspections? MCSIP levels 3 or 7

ALPR

Expired Registration

Does this License Plate have an expired registration?

ALPR

KY Prorate

Is KY a registered proration state?

ALPR

Registered Weight

Is this truck over its registered weight?

ALPR
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Table 7. Screening Data Sources
Screening Criterion

Data Source

All OOS Percentage
Driver OOS
Percentage

SAFER
SAFER

Vehicle OOS
Percentage

SAFER

Federal OOS
Hazmat OOS
Percentage

SAFER
SAFER

Liability Insurance
UCR
Safety Rating
KIT
KY HIRE
KYU
IFTA
ICC Exempt
PRISM
Expired Registration
KY Prorate
Registered Weight

SAFER
SAFER
SAFER
KY Clearinghouse
KY Clearinghouse
KY Clearinghouse
KY Clearinghouse/SAFER/IFTA Clearinghouse
KY Clearinghouse
SAFER (PRISM Target File)
SAFER
SAFER
SAFER

2.5.6 Administrative Features

The administration screen provides the capability to execute some administrative tasks and
special functions of the system. It may be accessed by utilizing the navigation menu and
selecting Admin.
This PRISM data section provides the ability to initiate a system database update. Selecting the
Remote SFTP option will use the existing configuration to connect to, download, and process any
available updated files. Alternatively, a local file (or files) may be used by specifying the folder
in which it is located.
The user can also manually run a daily report of the vehicles identified at the station. Options
include:
1)
2)
3)
4)

View the last report
FTP available files to the remote server
Show report for date
Run report for date

View the last report works as the name implies and will allow the user to view the last
Observation Report run by the system. Selecting the FTP available files to the remote server will
use the existing configuration to connect to and deliver files manually to the remote server using
24

the file transfer protocol. Show report for date will show the report uploaded to the server in
Frankfort for any given date and time entered. Run report for date records the results and
prepares them to be sent offsite. This is only used when the scheduled process didn’t run on its
own.
The user can also manually run the daily report for a summation of the number of trucks that
passed through the inspection station and the number of each type of violation identified by the
system. Options are:
1)
2)
3)
4)

View last report
Resend last report
Run report over specified date and time range, optionally emailing the results
Run report for specified date, optionally emailing the results

View the Last Report works as the name implies and will allow the user to view the last Daily
Report run by the system. Selecting the Resend Last Report will allow the user to manually
resend the last Daily Report run by the system. Run Daily Report for a specified date and time
range will allow users to run multiple reports over a specified date and time period and provides
the option to email the results or just view them on the screen. Run report for specified date will
only allow the user to run the report for any single date and provides the option to email the
results or view them on the monitor. These last two options would generally only be performed if
the scheduled process did not run on its own.
The user can manually run the daily vehicle report for a list of inspections that were found to be
in violation of a screening rule. The options for this report are similar to the Daily Report.
The ALPR Analyzation feature, when run, will dump images to the file system so that they may
be analyzed for accuracy. A valid date and time range must be specified or selected from the pop
up menu. Users can select to only look at the images that generated a fault (or yellow
designation) in the PARSS, look at all of the images in the date and time range, and decide
whether or not to include the images identified as having a potential expired registration.
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Chapter 3. System Performance
A thorough evaluation was conducted to assess the performance of the system (does it do what it
was intended to do), the value of the system in identifying a vehicle for inspection with PRISM
or CVISN-related issues, and the potential for more widespread deployment of this type of
screening system. In addition, the evaluation would also need to include a side-by-side
comparison of the two ALPR systems. System performance is summarized in this chapter while
information on the value of the system and potential for widespread deployment is summarized
in Chapter 4.
Data for this evaluation was collected in a number of ways. Data collection began in October
2012 and first consisted of simply observing the system on site and remotely through a remote
desktop application. Data being stored on the user interface in the inspection station was
downloaded for analysis by KTC staff. In addition, data was collected on-site during various
enforcement blitz activities where KSP-CVE personnel utilized the system to make stops at the
station. The system integrator and equipment vendors were made aware of the scheduled
activity. Care was taken to make sure any changes to the system were noted as the evaluation
proceeded.
The evaluation of the performance of the system was based on whether the system worked as it
was designed to work. The system functionality is rather complex as described in Chapter 2, but
for the purposes of the evaluation, the functionality was summarized in four basic categories:
1) Data Collection - The system captures data on every truck, attempts to decode the
identifying information, and correlates the data into a single transaction record.
2) Screening - The data from the recorded transaction is screened using the database on the
computer and the appropriate message is displayed on the user interface.
3) Tracking/Interception of the Vehicle - The vehicle is directed to pull in or stop if the
screening rule is on and a potential problem is identified.
4) User Interaction - The user interface provides the ability to manually screen vehicles,
provides access to historical data, and is easy to use and understand.

3.1 Data Collection
3.1.1 Data Capture

The system captures data on every vehicle that drives across the ramp WIM, including cars, with
very few exceptions. The system is always running and therefore captures data even when the
station is closed. For a complete record to be established, the following data elements should be
captured: a license plate image (or images) from the vendors, a USDOT image from the vendor,
an overhead image, a gross weight, and a transponder ID number (when a compatible
transponder is present and functioning on the vehicle). The ALPR and USDOTR will also
attempt to decode the license plate and USDOT numbers using OCR. All of this data is
correlated together as a single transaction record for the vehicle.
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Table 8 shows a summary of images reviewed from three enforcement blitzes held on January
23, January 30, and March 6 and 7. The column entitled “Total Images” shows the total number
of images that were reviewed on that date. This is not equivalent to all images captured on that
date but is only the total images reviewed and is meant to be a representative sample from the
day. The column, “Missing Data”, is the sum of missing data for the Perceptics ALPR, HTS
ALPR, and HTS USDOTR. Overall, the system only missed an image 0.29 percent of the time
and captured the images 99.71 percent of the time.
Table 8. Data Capture Rate During Screening Blitzes
Date

Total Images

Missing Data

% Missing

% Data Capture

1004
506
1778
3288

21
1
7
29

0.70
0.07
0.13
0.29

99.30
99.03
99.87
99.71

1/23/2013
1/30/2013
3/6/2013-3/7/2013
All

As mentioned earlier, other elements of a complete vehicle record would include weight data and
a transponder ID. A small sample (268 vehicles) were examined and it was determined that
weight was captured 100 percent of the time. Observation of the system both remotely and
during enforcement blitz activities seems to support this finding. The transponder ID would only
be captured when the vehicle was using a compatible and functioning transponder on the vehicle.
In order to test this element, the PrePass system was set to 100 percent pull-in. This allowed for
an increased number of transponder-equipped trucks to enter the inspection station and cross the
ramp. The list of PrePass trucks was then compared to the trucks going across the ramp with a
transponder ID. Ninety trucks were observed with a transponder, but the system only captured
38 transponder IDs, or 42.2 percent. After this test, the transponder reader was found to not be
functioning properly and was disconnected from the system. KYTC made the decision to
remove the transponder reader from the system based on two observations over the life of the
project: 1) Since PrePass transponder ID numbers are not shared with FMCSA and state
agencies, there is no way to access data using this identifier; and 2) Most other transponder ID
numbers (non-PrePass) that were read were not found in the database or tied to the wrong
vehicle.
3.1.2 Accuracy of the OCR

The system was assessed to see how often the character string and state/jurisdiction on each
truck license plate and the USDOT number on the side of the vehicle could be decoded
accurately. Although the system captured an image for virtually every truck that went through
the station, these images sometimes had flaws which made it difficult for the system to
accurately decode the license plate or USDOT number string. Sometimes the image was not
flawed but the license plate or the USDOT number was covered or had some problem making it
very difficult or impossible to decode. KTC developed a process to mark each image with a
success code or fail code to identify the success rate and describe and quantify technical
problems which caused system misreads. These codes were used to categorize each of the
images sampled from the enforcement blitzes.
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Table 9 provides a comprehensive list of those 28 codes, which are numbered 0 to 27. Success
was coded as “0”, and all of the other failure codes were numbered 1 to 27 according to the types
of problems detected by comparison of the image against the character string reported by the
screening system. Each failure code is briefly described in the description column. The fail codes
were tracked for each of the three systems, but as the “Type” column shows, some were
exclusive to ALPR cameras, some to the USDOTR camera, while others applied to both types of
equipment. Three of the failure codes (8, 17, and 18), noted in red font on the Table, were
ultimately excluded from the total numbers and accuracy calculations. Code 8 meant the vehicle
was not a commercial vehicle. This included KSP-CVE patrol cars or other private automobiles
that entered the station. These vehicles did not need to be screened and therefore would not
count against the accuracy of the system. Both codes 17 and 18 meant there was not enough
information to determine whether the decode was accurate or not, or even if an image or decode
was available for review for this particular vehicle. Since the objective was to determine how
well the system decoded the information, these records had to be discarded for this analysis as
well.
Table 10 displays the results of the sampled images from each of the enforcement blitzes, along
with a total from all blitzes. The table reports the total number images used in the sample,
successes, failures, and the percent success for the Perceptics ALPR, HTS ALPR, and HTS
USDOTR. More than half the total data comes from the final March 6 and 7 blitz, and most of
the rest come from the January 23 blitz. As such, those blitzes will be driving the totals to a
much greater degree than the January 30 data. The combined accuracy rate for the three systems
is somewhat higher for the January 30 data, which is possibly a function of weather variation and
sample size. Overall, the Perceptics ALPR system consistently has the highest accuracy rate of
the three systems, with a combined accuracy rate of 78.7 percent. The USDOTR system comes
in second with a combined accuracy of 73.7 percent, and the HTS ALPR was third with 71.8
percent. A sample of data was analyzed from the March 6 and 7 blitz to determine the likelihood
of identifying either the license plate or the USDOT number with the screening system. Data
from the Perceptics ALPR and the HTS USDOTR were utilized. A total of 1730 records were
analyzed and 1,625, or 93.9 percent had a correctly identified license plate number and
jurisdiction or a USDOT number.
There are some situations that make the identifiers difficult if not impossible to read with the
system. In order to take into account these unique situations, some fail codes were labeled as
“exceptions” and an adjusted accuracy rate was calculated. Table 11 lists these fail codes. For
the ALPR, the exceptions included two scenarios, one where the license plate was missing from
the front of the vehicle and the other where it was obstructed from view. For the USDOTR,
exceptions included situations where the display of the USDOT did not meet the federal
regulations. For this study, those failures included: a USDOT number that was rubbed off or
damaged, the use of “USDOT” on a different line from the number itself, or the use of
“U.S.D.O.T.”. Based on these exceptions, adjusted accuracy rates are presented in Table 12. The
Perceptics ALPR continued to perform with the highest accuracy rate, 82.6 percent. The HTS
ALPR was next with an adjusted accuracy rate of 75.5 percent, and the USDOTR had an
adjusted accuracy rate of 74.2 percent. It should be noted, that both companies were given
feedback on their systems and the opportunity to improve their accuracy rates. This information
is presented later in this Chapter.
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Table 9. List of Success, Failure Screening System Codes
#
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Description
Success
Image too dark
Image too light
Image is blurry or otherwise difficult to read.
System misinterpreted one or more characters
Reader missed a character
Reader added a character
Captured character string incorrectly assumed to be license plate, USDOT#
Vehicle is not a commercial vehicle
Partial Plate
License plate not captured
No plate in overview image/No plate on truck
Incorrect state/jurisdiction
License plate number visible and readable, but system failed to read
Camera caught wrong plate, assumed it was license plate
Dirty, Damaged, or bent license plate or lack of retroreflectivity
Decal or other obstruction on license plate (i.e. Oversized Load)
Data is missing
Unreadable Jurisdiction
USDOT not visible
USDOT partially out of camera view
USDOT number visible and readable, but system failed to read
USDOT number in a difficult-to-read font or hand written
USDOT number too small
USDOT number on a curve of the truck
USDOT number rubbed off or damaged
USDOT number was on a different line than "USDOT"
USDOT' spelled 'U.S.D.O.T.'
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Type
Either
Either
Either
Either
Either
Either
Either
Either
Either
ALPR
ALPR
ALPR
ALPR
ALPR
ALPR
ALPR
ALPR
Either
ALPR
USDOT
USDOT
USDOT
USDOT
USDOT
USDOT
USDOT
USDOT
USDOT

Table 10. Breakdown of Accuracy Rates by Equipment
January 23
ALPR/USDOT
Total Used
Successes
Fails
% Success

Perceptics
971
744
227
76.6%

HTS
979
691
288
70.6%

USDOT
981
719
262
73.3%

Perceptics
500
421
85
84.2%

HTS
500
384
124
76.8%

USDOT
500
380
122
76.0%

Perceptics
1,739
1,361
378
76.6%

HTS
1,741
1,236
505
71.0%

USDOT
1,756
1,285
471
73.2%

Perceptics
3,210
2,526
690
78.7%

HTS
3,220
2,311
917
71.8%

USDOT
3,237
2,384
855
73.7%

January 30
ALPR/USDOT
Total Used
Successes
Fails
% Success
March 6 and 7
ALPR/USDOT
Total Used
Successes
Fails
% Success
Overall
ALPR/USDOT
Total Used
Successes
Fails
% Success

Table 11. Fail Codes Labeled as Exceptions
#
11
16
25
26
27

Description
No plate in overview image/No plate on truck
Decal or other obstruction on license plate (i.e. Oversized Load)
USDOT number rubbed off or damaged
USDOT number was on a different line than "USDOT"
USDOT' spelled 'U.S.D.O.T.'
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Type
ALPR
ALPR
USDOT
USDOT
USDOT

Table 12. Adjusted Accuracy Rates
ALPR/USDOT
Total Images
Successes
Exceptions
Total (Removing Exceptions)
Adjusted Accuracy Rate

Perceptics

HTS

USDOT

3,210
2,526
150
3,060
82.6%

3,220
2,311
160
3,060
75.5%

3,237
2,384
25
3,212
74.2%

For license plates, 17.8 percent of all failures could be attributed to fail code 11 or 16 (one of the
exceptions). The majority of exceptions were fail code 11 which noted there was no plate in the
overview image or on the truck. Approximately four percent of the commercial vehicles coming
into the station that were a part of this analysis fell into this category. Most of these are
Kentucky intrastate, single-unit vehicles that are not required to display a license plate on the
front of the vehicle. Only a very small percentage of these vehicles were actually missing a
license plate. Table 12 displays the failures of the APLR by prevalence. The most common
reason for failure was that the system misinterpreted one or more characters (24.3 percent of the
time). There is no obvious reason for this failure, but in this situation the system attempted to
read the plate and failed on one or more characters. The next most prevalent failure was
associated with dirty, damaged, bent license plates or those lacking retroreflectivity.
Approximately five percent of the commercial vehicles coming through the station had a license
plate in such poor condition that it was unreadable or barely readable by a human observer. Two
other prevalent failures were identification of the incorrect jurisdiction (code 12) and license
plate visible and readable, but system failed to read (code 13). Code 12 indicates that the plate
string was correctly interpreted, but the state or jurisdiction was not. Codes 13 gives no
indication as to why the failure occurred only that the plate was deemed unreadable by the OCR
and no decode was attempted. Other failures occurring much less frequently are listed in Table
13.
Table 13. ALPR Failures by Prevalence
Fail
Code
4
15
11
12
13
5
6
16
10
7

Fail Description*
System misinterpreted one or more characters
Dirty, Damaged, or bent license plate or lack of retroreflectivity
No plate in overview image/No plate on truck
Incorrect state/jurisdiction
License plate number visible and readable, but system failed to read
Reader missed a character
Reader added a character
Decal or other obstruction on license plate (i.e. Oversized Load)
License plate not captured
Captured character string incorrectly assumed to be license plate,
USDOT#

Percentage
of Failures
24.3
18.3
14.8
10.3
8.8
4.1
3.0
3.0
2.6

*All other fail codes associated with the ALPR account for less than 1 percent of the failures.
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1.1

For the USDOTR, less than three percent of all failures could be attributed to one of the fail
codes noted as an exception (code 25, 26, or 27). All of these were fail code 25 which noted the
USDOT had been rubbed off or damaged in some way. Table 13 displays the failures of the
USDOTR by prevalence. The most common reason for failure (50.9 percent of the time) was
that the USDOT was not visible in the image. This is largely due to the fact that the USDOT
number can be anywhere on the side of the tractor. USDOT numbers located very high or low
on the tractor, or ones that are very close to the front or back of the tractor are easily missed by
the system. This may also be attributed to a lack of contrast between the side of the truck and the
number. This problem causes the system to be unable to locate the number. If fail code 20 is
taken into consideration, 57.2 percent of the failures were due to the USDOT not being captured
or only partially captured by the USDOTR. The next most prevalent fail codes were 21 and 4.
Code 21 indicates that a human observer could discern the number but the system did not attempt
to decode the information. Code 4 indicates that the system attempted to decode the information
but simply failed with one or more numbers. It’s understood from the vendors that character
spacing and contrast between the side of the truck and the lettering causes difficulty for the
systems. Code 22 represented 6.7 percent of the failures and indicates that the font style was
unusual or difficult to read or the number was hand written. Codes 6 and 5 combined make up
7.5 percent of all the failures and indicate that a character was added or missed for some reason
that is not clear. Other failures occurring much less frequently are listed in Table 14.
Table 14. USDOTR Failures by Prevalence
Fail
Code
19
21
4
22
20
6
5
25
7

Fail Description*
USDOT not visible
USDOT number visible and readable, but system failed to read
System misinterpreted one or more characters
USDOT number in a difficult-to-read font or hand written
USDOT partially out of camera view
Reader added a character
Reader missed a character
USDOT number rubbed off or damaged
Camera caught a string of characters on the truck which it incorrectly
assumed was the license plate or USDOT #

Percentage
of Failures
50.9
13.3
8.3
6.7
6.3
4.0
3.5
2.9
2.7

*All other fail codes associated with the USDOTR account for less than 1 percent of the failures.

3.1.2.1 Post Evaluation Accuracy Rates
Once the evaluation ended, both vendors were provided with feedback on how their systems
performed and given the opportunity to make adjustments. Data was taken from July 9 to see if
any improvements could be seen with the accuracy rates. Both vendors improved their accuracy
rates with this feedback as displayed in Table 15. The percent difference shows how the
accuracy rate changed from the previously calculated accuracy rates in Tables 10 and 12. While
Perceptics, saw a 2 to 3 percent increase, HTS saw more than a 13 percent increase in accuracy
rates. The changes to the USDOTR were not completed by July 9 therefore the USDOTR data
was taken from July 18, once the changes were implemented. The USDOTR system also saw a
slight improvement in the accuracy rate.
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Table 15. Post Evaluation Accuracy Rates
ALPR/USDOT
Total Images Used
Average Accuracy Rates
Percent Difference
Adjusted Accuracy Rates
Percent Difference

Perceptics

HTS

USDOT

884
82.4%
+3.7
85.2%
+2.6

872
85.2%
+13.4
88.7%
+13.3

504
76.0%
+2.3
76.0%
+1.8

3.1.2.2 Effects of Weather and Lighting
Table 16 shows the number of images reviewed and the adjusted accuracy rates for each system
based on the weather and lighting conditions. The first category, “Day, Clear”, indicates that the
images reviewed were taken during full daylight hours (not during dawn or dusk) with clear
weather conditions (no precipitation). The majority of the data collected and reviewed can be
classified in this category. The second category, “Night, Clear”, indicates that the images
reviewed were taken during nighttime hours when it was completely dark with clear weather
conditions (no precipitation). The third category, “Day, Rain”, indicates the images reviewed
were taken during full daylight hours (not during dawn or dusk) with light rain falling. The
fourth category, “Day, Snow” indicates the images reviewed were taken during full daylight
hours (not during dawn or dusk) with snow falling or having recently fallen (where some plates
were observed to be at least partially covered in snow). For the Perceptics’ ALPR system,
performance was best (86.3 percent) for the “Night, Clear” category. Data from the “Day, Rain”
category shows high accuracy rates also (85.6 percent). “Day, Clear” data shows an accuracy
rate of 80.3 percent which is slightly lower than the average adjusted accuracy rate calculated for
the evaluation in Table 12. The “Day, Snow” data shows a significant drop in accuracy with
65.4 percent. For the HTS ALPR system, the “Day, Rain” category has the highest accuracy rate
(80.0 percent). The “Night, Clear” data has the next highest accuracy at 76.3 percent. “Day,
Clear” data shows an accuracy rate of 74.1 percent which is lower than the average adjusted rate
calculated for the HTS ALPR in Table 12. Like the Perceptics ALPR, a significant drop in
accuracy is seen with the “Day, Snow” data (55.6 percent). Based on this data, it appears low
lighting conditions (either at night or overcast conditions) have a positive effect on the ALPR
systems. This is most likely due to the use of retroreflective license plates and infrared lighting
by the systems. Both ALPR systems had the lowest accuracy rates during the “Day, Snow”
category. This seems to primarily be because the snow would stick to the license plate becoming
an obstruction for the APLR systems. For the USDOTR system, the best accuracy rates are
noted during the “Day, Rain” category. “Day, Snow” and “Day, Clear” have nearly identical
accuracy rates, which seems to indicate light snow has little to no effect on the accuracy rates of
the USDOTR system. The lowest accuracy rates for the USDOTR system were noted during the
“Night, Clear” period. Poor lighting conditions led to a decrease in accuracy of 7 to 8 percent for
the USDOTR system.
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Table 16. Images Reviewed and Adjusted Accuracy Rates by Weather and
Lighting
Conditions
Day, Clear
Night, Clear
Day, Rain
Day, Snow

Perceptics
2001
710
500
496

80.3%
86.3%
85.6%
65.4%

HTS
2012
709
500
496

74.1%
76.3%
80.0%
55.6%

USDOT
2020
717
500
499

75.4%
69.3%
76.5%
75.5%

3.1.2.3 Side by Side Comparison of ALPR
Two ALPR systems were installed side-by-side for this study to compare their performance.
Although the two companies approached the task a little differently, both camera systems were
pointed at the front of the truck to capture the front license plate and decode the plate string and
jurisdiction. The Perceptics system was installed first and as of the release of this report,
continues to be operational. Perceptics utilized two ALPR cameras for the task in order to get a
wider field of view of the front of the vehicle. There was no integrated lighting with the
cameras, but a stroboscopic illuminator was utilized to provide filtered light. Perceptics
provided quarterly preventative maintenance, which included cleaning of the lens and inspection
of the equipment from installation through the evaluation period. The only physical change to
the original system was the replacement of a bulb on the illuminator. Upgrades to the software
were necessary to optimize the accuracy of the system. The HTS system was installed a few
months after the Perceptics system and also continues to be operational as of the release of this
report. HTS also installed two cameras to increase their accuracy rates. HTS cameras have
integrated lighting with their ALPR cameras. One camera was using infrared and the other white
lighting. The camera with infrared lighting was replaced after the evaluation because it was not
working properly. White lighting is currently all that is utilized with the HTS cameras. HTS
does not perform regular preventative maintenance, but comes out as requested if problems are
reported. Prior to the evaluation, no hardware changes were made, but software changes were
made to optimize the system.
Table 17 displays the various accuracy rates and the percent difference of the accuracy rates
between the two vendors. The first is the average of all conditions and the second is the adjusted
average taking into consideration some exceptions as noted in Table 11. Both systems are also
compared by the lighting condition and weather. The Perceptics ALPR outperformed the HTS
ALPR in all evaluation period conditions by 5.6 to 10.0 percent. The biggest difference in
accuracy rates is shown with the nighttime and snow data where the Perceptics cameras
performed 10 percent better than the HTS camera. Both vendors were provided with feedback
after the evaluation and given the opportunity to make adjustments. The HTS system saw more
than a 13 percent improvement in accuracy rates and outperformed the Perceptics system in this
category by approximately 3 percent.
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Table 17. Side-by-side Accuracy Rates by Vendor
Perceptics
Conditions
Evaluation Period
Average
Average Adjusted
Daylight Adjusted
Nighttime Adjusted
Rain Adjusted
Snow Adjusted
Post Evaluation
Improved Average
Improved Adjusted

HTS

% Accuracy

% difference

% Accuracy

% difference

78.7
82.6
80.3
86.3
85.6
65.4

+6.9
+7.1
+6.2
+10.0
+5.6
+9.8

71.8
75.5
74.1
76.3
80.0
55.6

-6.9
-7.1
-6.2
-10.0
-5.6
-9.8

82.4
85.2

-2.8
-3.5

85.2
88.7

+2.8
+3.5

3.1.3 Miscorrelations

Data miscorrelation occurs whenever information (license plate, USDOT number and weight
data) are incorrectly linked together by the screening system. When data miscorrelation occurs,
information for a particular inspection will show up in an obviously incorrect manner in the
Truck Details window. Typically there will be images from two distinct trucks, where USDOT
number, license plate information, and weight information clearly do not match. The correlation
of this data is handled through the screening software and is based upon the time the data is
received. There is a window of time in which data is expected and then the window is closed to
new data. Correlation of the data is complicated by the fact that this screening system has data
being supplied by two different vendors. Even so, this problem occurred less than two percent of
the time during the data collection period. Researchers and enforcement officials have noticed
this issue tends to happen most frequently whenever trucks get backed up on the ramp. When the
trucks pass the ALPR and USDOTR equipment and go through the WIM sorting system at a
lower rate of speed than usual, the system will sometimes erroneously assume two trucks closely
spaced together is actually just one vehicle. In those instances, information gets scrambled in
one flawed inspection rather than completing two correctly, independently created inspections.
ITERIS, who is under contract to complete work on subsequent screening systems, has
implemented programming solutions to further reduce instances of data miscorrelation. Future
sites will also only have one image capture and processing vendor supplying data to the
screening system, which will further eliminate correlation problems.

3.2 Screening Data
As noted in Chapter 2, commercial vehicles passing through the station are screened against data
injected into the screening system, generically speaking, from the SAFER database and the
Kentucky Clearinghouse. Every screening flag/category is screened against corresponding data
from a single source. In this sense, the data is always screened correctly. However, the accuracy
of such data is dependent on a multitude of factors, and various data quality issues have been
identified which can lead to incorrectly characterized violations. With general respect to data
quality problems, some originate during the data collection point, some at the point in which
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Kentucky (and other states) send data to the national clearinghouses (for SAFER, PRISM,
International Registration Plan (IRP), IFTA, etc.) and in some cases when the data is pushed out
to various servers used by individual states to configure their commercial vehicle screening
systems. Data collection issues can be the result of data collection errors or inadequate collection
of data. An example of the former would be an incorrectly entered USDOT number or license
plate number. In an effort to combat this issue, Kentucky is transitioning from manually filed
permitting and credential applications and tax returns to electronic filing. Automatically
populating basic data fields from existing databases reduces duplicative data entry and reduces
errors in commercial screening databases. The second type of problem requires changes in data
collection policies. For example, registrant information is no longer collected, which leads to the
screening system’s identification of potential KYU violators who are actually legal, but
unbeknownst to KSP CVE officials are actually operating under the tax license of the leaser.
Data uploading and downloading between state and federal entities, particularly for complex data
such as the apportionment, weight and registration data that accompanies truck vehicle data for
IRP carriers, can be problematic. Some states send more comprehensive vehicle information than
others, which also creates inequities and data quality issues. Safety data from the PRISM target
file is somewhat less susceptible to such problems, in large part because carrier-level data tends
to be more complete than vehicle-level data. Data concerning OOS rates for drivers, vehicles, or
hazmat carriers are obviously driver or vehicle specific in some cases, but safety data is
essentially different in that vehicles are screened on tendencies to have an unsafe safety record
rather than known credentials violations. Any calculation or tabulation of violation
characterization accuracy has to be considered in context of these data issues. For more
information on the value of the screening that occurred, refer to Chapter 4 of this report.
After screening against the data, the system would categorize the vehicle record. Those with a
potential problem and targeted by enforcement should be marked in red. Those with a potential
problem but not targeted by enforcement should be marked in yellow. Blue indicates that there
was not enough information to screen the vehicle and green means that no problem was
identified. After observing the system for several hours on multiple occasions, there was no
instance in which this categorizing did not work properly.

3.3 Vehicle Tracking and Interception
KSP-CVE officials have requested some changes in terms of the way the system is interfaced
with the Mettler-Toledo sorting system. Officials want to change the way the sorting system
handles trucks that have been sent to the static scale. Currently, those trucks are held for a period
of roughly 30 seconds. If no action is taken by station officials, a default release mechanism
kicks in, allowing the truck to exit the station. In cases of serious violations, such as a FOOS,
KSP-CVE officials would like these trucks to be held at the static truck indefinitely until a
manual decision can be made. In order to help facilitate greater awareness about the nature of a
particular violation, officers would like a variable alarm tone system integrated with the sorting
system which provides a distinct alarm for the various safety violations. In effect, this creates a
three-signal system. The system would allow a bypass (for trucks with no issues or trucks the
system was unable to screen), a static scale and release option (screened issue not deemed a top
priority), and a static scale and hold option, which would hold screened trucks at the static scale
indefinitely while sounding an alarm at a specified interval.
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3.4 User Interface
The PARSS user interface is quite intuitive and straightforward in terms of design. As noted in
Section 2.5, the user interface includes an identifying banner at the top, a navigation button on
the upper left side, a truck listing window which in a sense also functions as a navigation menu,
and a content window which spans roughly two-thirds of the screen. The design includes plenty
of white space to give each element separation and help it to stand out, and create balance for the
web application.4 It appears to have the characteristics of a grid layout, with roughly two-thirds
of the screen dedicated to content, which is in accordance with generally accepted design
standards.5 The functionality of the system is rather limited, as the application itself has but one
primary function. Users can change the settings specified in Section 2.5, enter license plate
numbers, jurisdictions, USDOT numbers and (if applicable) transponder IDs. The user may also
navigate the inspection history by filtering the inspection history. Generally speaking, the
system’s user interface is fairly easy to learn and use, according to researcher interviews with
commercial vehicle enforcement officials. During the initial evaluation phase, and during
everyday usage, officials and researchers developed a list of proposed improvements to the
current user interface to be included in future versions of the screening application.
A list of the proposed issues and fixes includes:
1. The application does not display the ISS score on the Truck Details view for each
vehicle. Currently it is only on displayed in the Truck Listing pane. This should be added
to the Truck Details window so that the information is easier to find.
2. The Search function does not give users the ability to search by a particular USDOT
number and license plate. Adding this functionality will make it easier to review past
inspection files.
3. The Truck Listing does not provide users information about where truck violations were
not displayed because the confidence level from the USDOTR and ALPRs was too low.
The suggested remedy is to highlight these cases in the Truck Listing pane.
4. The FOOS warning device can be turned off in the software’s current format. KSP-CVE
would like the flexibility to toggle this setting.
5. The “Safety Rating” flag is based on stale data that has no screening value. The “All
OOS” is essentially a combination of “HOOS” and “VOOS” flags, making it redundant
and unnecessary. These flags need to be removed.
6. KSP-CVE would like the ability to run reports by the USDOT number and license plate
number, as well as fault type. The system is not currently setup to run reports in this
manner.

4
5

Beaird, Jason. 2010. The Principles of Beautiful Web Design. 2nd ed. SitePoint: Canada.
Ibid.

38

7. There is a bug with the screening system where user settings get set to default levels after
a certain interval of time has passed. This needs to be addressed so that user changes to
settings are appropriately preserved.
8. The magnifying glass tool that is used to provide zoomed images of truck plates and
decals needs to be rectangular in shape rather than circular. The end goal should be a
magnification tool wide enough to provide the entire character string all at once, without
having to scroll across the image.
9. There is an option to toggle overhead images and plate images in the Truck Listing pane,
but this option needs to be removed, as the plate images are of no value without
magnification. The overhead images should be used, and there is no need for the other
option.
10. KTC researchers need to do more work to determine what reports are needed by KSPCVE officials, and which are not.
11. Commercial vehicle enforcement
reorganization of system flags:
Safety
FOOS
DOOS Percentage
VOOS Percentage
HOOS Percentage
PRISM (targeted for inspection)

officials

are

recommending

the

following

Credentials
UCR
Liability Insurance
ICC Exempt
IFTA
KIT
KY HIRE
KYU
Registration
Ky Prorate
Registered Weight
Expired Registration
Each screening criterion could be turned on or off by clicking the corresponding radio
button. The system would be equipped so that each of these groups (Safety, Credentials,
Registration) could be flipped on or off with a separate radio button for each group of
criteria.
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3.4.1 Manual Corrections

The ability to manually key in corrections was included as part of the design of the user interface
and appears to work properly. A user may manually key in a license plate number, jurisdiction,
or USDOT number, and the vehicle will be rescreened. These strings are checked by the user,
who can make use of the magnifying glass tool included in the user interface to check the license
plate and USDOT number decals to make sure the information is correct. If a manual correction
is entered, the truck is rescreened with the correct data. If this is done shortly after the vehicle
appears on the user interface, the vehicle can easily be stopped before exiting the inspection
station using the inspection tracking system and signage. The system has been designed to track
the number of manual data corrections made by users, which provides a useful metric with which
to assess the success rate of the automated screening process. Table 18 provides the manual
corrections data for the system during the enforcement blitz periods. The average manual
corrections rate was 12.5 percent.
Table 18. Manual Corrections for PARSS
Date # Corrections Total Trucks Screened Correction Rate
248
1,389
17.9
1/23/2013
279
1,876
14.9
1/30/2013
468
4,700
10.0
3/6/2013
995
7,965
12.5
Total
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Chapter 4. System Outcomes
This chapter presents the generated PARSS system outcomes from a 22 hour enforcement blitz,
which occurred March 6-7 at the Boone County inspection station. The enforcement activity
included researchers from KTC, KYTC officials, as well as KSP-CVE officers and inspectors.
The primary enforcement objective was to test the system effectiveness in terms of correctly
flagging registration, credential and safety violations. Specifically, the enforcement detail
personnel enabled the following screening rules: FOOS, DOOS rate, VOOS rate, HOOS rate,
PRISM, UCR, KYU, insurance, expired registration, IFTA, KY-for-hire, and registered weight.
KTC officials monitored the ramp screening system to make sure it was functioning properly and
recorded details about each vehicle given a FAIL flag (red designation) during the enforcement
blitz. KSP-CVE officers and inspectors conducted inspections. KYTC officials answered
permitting, credentialing and tax questions on-site. After the blitz, the KTC spreadsheet was
compared with official KSP-CVE and KYTC records to assess screening outcomes detailed
below. Table 19 shows the number of hours, total truck traffic passing through the scale, and the
number of trucks passing through the scale during the blitz period. The “Day” column refers to
the enforcement period occurring during normal station operation hours (8:00 AM-4:30 PM,
although the blitz actually began at 10:00 AM). “Night refers to the rest of the blitz period,
which occurred from 4:30 PM to 8:00 AM the following day. During the blitz, 4,700 trucks
passed through the station. As expected, daytime traffic was slightly higher in terms of truck
value when one compares the average trucks per hour for daytime activity with nighttime
activity, although traffic through the station was generally constant during the blitz. Already the
tremendous advantages of the system are apparent. Detailed truck counts are available. Virtually
every truck going through the station is photographed and screened, with the system automating
the vast majority of the WIM scale sorting decisions.
Table 19. Blitz Hours and Truck Volumes
Statistic
Hours

Day

Night

Total

6.5

15.5

22

Total Truck Traffic 1,587 3,113 4,700
Trucks Per Hour

244

201

214

4.1 Inspections
Researchers recorded information about each truck stopped for an inspection, including the type
of inspection to which the vehicle or driver was submitted. The FMCSA defines such an
inspection as follows:
A roadside inspection is an examination of individual commercial motor vehicles
and drivers by a Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) inspector to
determine if they are in compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations (FMCSRs) and/or Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs). Serious
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violations result in the issuance of DOOS or VOOS orders. These violations must
be corrected before the affected driver or vehicle can return to service.6
All inspections conducted during the enforcement blitz were Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3
inspections.7 Level 1 inspections are the most comprehensive inspections, including a thorough
driver and vehicle examination. Level 2 inspections include a driver inspection and a vehicle
walk-around, which is slightly less comprehensive than the vehicle inspection protocol followed
in a Level 1 inspection. Finally, there are Level 3 inspections, which are driver-only inspections.8
Table 20 shows the number of Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 inspections that were conducted at
the Boone County inspection station during the March 6-7 blitz along with the 2012 totals for
Kentucky. The distribution of each inspection type as a percentage of all inspections is reported
in the second column. Most of the 17 Level 1 inspections, which constituted 23.6 percent of all
inspections, occurred during the latter part of the blitz, largely because of personnel scheduling.
Level 2 inspections represented the lowest percentage of overall inspections (6.9 percent). Most
of the inspections (69.4 percent) conducted were Level 3 inspections, which were generally
conducted as a follow-up to credential and registration screening. The third column reports total
roadside inspections conducted in Kentucky in FY 2012.9 The distribution of blitz inspections is
different than the latest available annual totals. Level 1 inspections constitute a larger percentage
of the state inspection totals (34.6 percent) than the blitz total. Level 2 inspections, of which only
five were conducted during the March blitz, actually constitute 28 percent of all state inspections
in 2012. During the blitz there were more Level 3 inspections conducted than is typical given the
statewide numbers. The difference is largely a product of having a large enforcement detail.
Given the limited space for Level 1 and Level 2 inspections, several officers and inspectors
focused primarily on Level 3 inspections.
Table 20. Inspection Totals
Level

Blitz Total

Blitz %

2012 Ky. Total

2012 Ky. %

1

17

23.6

36,690

34.6

2

5

6.9

29,653

28.0

3

50

69.4

39,563

37.4

Total

72

99.9

105,906

100

4.2 Daytime vs. Nighttime Operations
One question the research team wanted to investigate was whether non-compliant trucks are
more likely to pass through the inspection station at night. Screening vehicles at night is much
easier with PARSS because it effectively collects visual information about every vehicle at times
when a lack of daylight makes it difficult for human eyes to see USDOT and license plate
numbers. The intuition was that non-compliant carriers are more likely to operate on main roads
whenever they expect the inspection stations to be closed. The Boone County inspection station
6

FMCSA. 2013. “North American Standard Driver/Vehicle Inspection Levels.” Accessed 6 June 2013.
No Level 4, Level 5, or Level 6 inspections were conducted as part of this enforcement detail.
8
FMCSA. “North American Standard Driver/Vehicle Inspection Levels.”
9
This would be the federal government’s fiscal year, which begins October 1, and not Kentucky’s, which begins July
7
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is rarely open at night, so the blitz had the potential to be an interesting test case. Table 21 below
breaks down the number of system FAIL codes recorded at the inspection station over the 22
hour blitz period. Vehicles given no FAIL code by the screening system are those receiving a
PASS, WARNING, or FAULT. Daytime FAILs totaled 77 – a rate of 14.1 per hour. Nighttime
FAILs totaled 249, or 16.0 per hour. The ramp screening system vehicle fail rate was 5.8 percent
during the day and 8.0 percent during nighttime hours. A chi2 test of the cross-tabulated data in
Table 21 shows a small but statistically significant difference – trucks passing through the station
during nighttime hours were more likely to be tagged with a FAIL code than those passing
through during daytime hours. However, the results should be interpreted with caution. While it
can be definitively said the differences are not owed to sampling error, it is possible that
measurement bias is driving the difference. Given the USDOTR accuracy declined after dark, the
reason that nighttime carriers are given FAILs at a higher rate could be explained by the greater
frequency of USDOT misreads after dark. Staffing levels were also inconsistent from one shift to
the next. This caused a skew in how the inspections were conducted. For example, almost all of
the Level 1 inspections were conducted at night, so there was no way to compare vehicle
inspections from daytime hours to nighttime hours. Furthermore, a large sample of actual
inspections conducted during both time periods is probably necessary to conduct a detailed
analysis. The question of whether non-complaint carriers are more likely to operate at night is a
fascinating one, but no definitive conclusions on that question can be offered based on the data
derived from this study. A more carefully planned research design is needed, as is a way to
account for the daytime-nighttime difference in the accuracy of the ramp screening equipment.
Table 21. Number of Vehicles Tagged with FAIL Codes During Day and at Night
Screening
Outcome

Day

Night

Total

77

249

326

No “FAIL”

1510

2864

4374

Total

1587

3113

4700

FAIL

Chi2 = 16.125, Pr=0.000

4.3 Screening Outcomes: Totals and Hourly Rates
This section examines the totals and hourly rates for FAIL flags, inspections, citations, charges
and violations. Inspections are the total number of Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 inspections.
Citations are documents issued for particular types of legal violations, and generally apply to
credential and registration issues. Charges are specific violations of state and federal statutes or
regulations enumerated in a citation. Some citations have only one charge; others have several
charges. Citations are not generally issued for safety violations, but such violations are listed
along with citable offenses in the Driver/Vehicle Examination Reports created in Aspen. This
distinction is useful for legal reasons and research analysis because it makes tracking system
performance for credentials, registration and safety easy to break down. Table 22 displays the
total for FAIL flags, inspections, citations, charges and safety violations, along with an hourly
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rate. As stated earlier, the screening system computer flagged 326 vehicles as potential violators.
Of those 326 trucks/drivers, 72 were subject to a Level 1, Level 2 or Level 3 inspection. The
enforcement detail issued 49 citations containing 65 charges, and found 62 safety violations. On
an hourly basis, the system flagged roughly 15 potential vehicles and generated about 3 to 4
inspections per hour. On average, multiple citations and notices of safety violations were issued
each hour. The enforcement detail issued a citation, notice of safety violations or both in 62 of 72
inspections, which makes the citation/violation rate 86.1 percent. The research team was quite
pleased with this result, because it means the screening system is quite accurately and efficiently
directing enforcement officials to carriers with registration, credentialing or safety violations. It
is also evidence that commercial screening performance can be significantly improved at
inspection stations where the system is installed, as the citation/violation rate for the Boone
County PARSS fares quite favorable to the pre-system citation/violation rate of 47.9 percent for
FY 2011.
Table 22. FAIL Flags, Inspections, Citations, Charges and Safety Violations
Statistic

Total Per Hour

FAIL Flags

326

14.8

Inspections

72

3.3

Citations

49

2.2

Charges

65

3.0

Safety Violations

62

2.8

4.4 Safety Enforcement
The PARSS can effectively identify trucks with a high likelihood of safety violations. Most of
the safety inspections were conducted on carriers in the PRISM target file, and carriers with a
high DOOS or VOOS. During the blitz, 230 trucks were flagged with 247 potential safety
problems by the system. If the screening process returned FAIL flags on those criteria they were
automatically sent to the static scale and later inspected if there were available personnel. Table
23 displays the number of safety violations by inspection level and the frequency distribution of
safety violations. The vast majority of safety violations were uncovered by Level 1 inspections,
which is as expected. Level 1 inspections are the most thorough, safety-oriented inspections. The
five Level 2 inspections revealed only a single violation. Level 3 inspections revealed eight
violations, all of them related to driver safety. The table indicates that only 27.8 percent of all
inspections uncovered any safety violations. However, most of the inspections with no safety
violations were Level 3, or driver-only, inspections. If the sample is limited to Level 1 and Level
2 inspections, the data indicate that safety violations were documented in 14 of those 22
inspections. The adjusted percentage of inspections with at least one safety violation would be
63.6 percent. This is a more accurate way to assess the system’s success rate for safety
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enforcement because vehicle enforcement officers focused on commercial vehicle safety would
not conduct such a large percentage of Level 3 inspections.
Table 23. Safety Violations by Inspection Level
Inspection Level

Violations

53

Inspections
w/Violations to Total
Inspections
13/17

Percent of
Inspections
w/Violations
76.5

1
2

1

1/5

20

3

8

6/50

12

Total

62

20/72

27.8

Table 24 displays the safety violations discovered as a result of inspections conducted by the
enforcement detail. The first column lists specific types of safety violations, which are
alphabetized here. The descriptions correspond to violations outlined in the Code of Federal
Regulations, although the specific citation codes are not displayed. The second column lists the
total number of that specific violation type. The third column reports the number of those
violations committed by carriers in the PRISM target file. The most common violation found
was “Flat tire or, inadequate tire tread,” with 13 instances. Brake violations of various types were
also quite common. They were not combined into a single category in the chart because officers
used different violation codes when creating the Aspen Examination Report. Inspectors and
officers also discovered five instances of logbook violations. All other violations were
documented fewer than five times during the enforcement blitz. The takeaway from this table is
that identification of PRISM carriers is an extremely useful criterion for safety inspections, as
61.3 percent of all safety violations reported were for vehicles in the PRISM target file. Because
so many PRISM vehicles are identified by the system (there were 137 during the enforcement
blitz), enforcement officials have identified a few shortcuts that help them decide whether or not
to inspect a vehicle flagged as PRISM by the PARSS. The first step is to look at the truck to see
whether it is a new model. Trucks that are less than two years old have few safety violations in
the experience of commercial vehicle enforcement staff. A simple visual inspection of the
vehicle from inside the station is also useful to this end. Second, they look up the carrier ISS
score to see if they are considered good candidates for inspection. Third, if another vehicle from
the same carrier has already been inspected and had no violations, officers and inspectors
typically release the truck so they can inspect a vehicle belonging to a different carrier.
Enforcement officials contend that inspecting multiple vehicles from the same carrier in one day
creates a fairness issue from the trucking industry’s perspective, and generally does not result in
the discovery of many safety violations.
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Table 24. Detailed Safety Violations for All Vehicles and PRISM Carriers
Description

All

PRISM

ABS dash lamp failure

3

2

Automatic airbrake adjustment system
failure

4

2

Brakes out of adjustment

3

3

Brakes out-of-service

4

2

Defective ABS indicator lamp for trailer

2

2

Discharged fire extinguisher

1

1

Driver log violation

5

2

Driving a CMV while CDL suspended

1

1

Driving beyond driving limit, duty period

2

0

Expired insurance

1

1

Expired medical certificate

1

1

Flat tire, inadequate tire tread

13

7

Frame cracked

1

1

Inadequate brakes, brakes out of
adjustment

11

5

Inoperative brake axle

2

1

Inoperative marker lamp

3

3

Lamp malfunction

1

1

No warning device

1

1

Oil or grease leaking from hub

1

0

Possessing license when privileges are
revoked

1

1

Steering system arm loose

1

1

Total

62

38
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Another way to quantify the safety benefits is to monitor the VOOS and DOOS numbers and
rates. These rates were tracked for the January 23 safety blitz in addition to the March 6 safety,
credentials and registration blitz. Table 25 displays the VOOS and DOOS numbers and rates for
both dates, along with the total and the average VOOS and DOOS percentage. In each instance,
the VOOS rate is much higher than the national VOOS rate, which is 20.2 percent for FY 2012.10
However, the DOOS rate for both blitzes is significantly lower than the national average, which
is 4.9 percent. The reasons for the lack of DOOS outcomes are unknown, although the system
did uncover several driver-related violations, which resulted in several notices of safety
violations, and five charges on four citations. It should be noted however, that this system does
not identify driver-related problems; it only identifies companies with a history of driver-related
problems.
Table 25. VOOS and DOOS: Numbers and Rates
Outcome

Jan. 23

Jan. 23 %

Mar. 6

Mar. 6 %

Total

Avg %

VOOS

7

43.8

6

27.2

13

34.2

DOOS

0

0

1

1.4

1

1.1

Perhaps the most significant development is the system’s ability to identify carriers with a FOOS
order. FOOS orders are issued to carriers that receive a final unsatisfactory safety rating, fail to
pay federal fines levied by FMCSA, are determined to be an imminent hazard, or new entrants
who fail to schedule an audit, or fail to pass an audit, within their first 18 months of operation.11
During the blitz, two carriers were identified with a FOOS. Carriers with a VOOS, DOOS, and
particularly a FOOS order, represent a significant safety risk. PRISM carriers and carriers
identified by the Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement System (SafeStat) are significantly
more likely to be involved in accidents than those who are not. Violators who do not improve
safety standards or who are flagrantly non-compliant must face severe consequences in order for
overall trucking industry safety to improve.12 The safety benefits of roadside inspections are
difficult to quantify, but FMCSA officials estimated that 8,149 crashes, 5,206 injuries, and 276
lives were saved in FY2009 as a result of roadside inspection programs around the country.13 A
screening tool that provides a VOOS that, when averaged, is 14 percent higher than the national
average should substantially enhance these safety benefits. Another benefit is more efficient
10
FMCSA. 2013. “Summary of Roadside Inspections.” Accessed 7 June 2013 at:
http://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/SafetyProgram/RoadsideInspections.aspx
11
FMCSA. 2013. “Federal Out-of-Service Orders.” Accessed 7 June 2013 at: http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safetysecurity/PRISM/prism-MCSIP.aspx
12
FMCSA. 2013. “Performance and Registration Information Systems Management (PRISM) – Benefits.” Accessed 7
June 2013 at: http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safety-security/prism/benefits.aspx
13
FMCSA. 2009. “FMCSA Safety Program Effectiveness Measurement: Intervention Model Fiscal Year 2009.”
Accessed 10 May 2013 at: http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/documents/factsresearch/Intervention%20FY%202009%20Analysis%20Brief.pdf
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enforcement. During the March 6 blitz, 14 of 22 Level 1 and Level 2 inspections revealed safety
violations; during the January 23 blitz, 11 of 16 Level 1 and Level 2 inspections revealed safety
violations. Collectively, the safety violation rate for these two blitzes (excluding Level 3
inspections) is 65.8 percent. As enforcement performance improves, carriers may react with
higher levels of compliance with safety laws and regulations, which is the ultimate goal of
roadside inspections.

4.5 Credentials and Registration Enforcement
In addition to providing greatly enhanced safety screening, the screening process also allows
enforcement officials to provide comprehensive enforcement of various federal and state
registration and credentials requirements. The primary focus of the credential and screening
process during the March 6 blitz was UCR, KYU, FOOS, Expired Registration, IFTA, and
Overweight violations. Registration data quality issues make it difficult to screen trucks using
decoded license plate strings. Technically the system functions according to design, but the data
against which the system is screening is unreliable. During the blitz officials decided to disable
the Expired Registration screening rule because a couple of trucks were stopped based on
erroneous FAIL codes generated by the system. The UCR, KYU, Insurance, IFTA, KY-For-Hire
and Registered Weight screening rules were turned on for the duration of the blitz.
Citations and charges were tracked in order to assess the performance of the system’s screening
and credentialing rules. In Table 26, the total charges are reported by inspection level. Also, the
number of inspections with charges or citations (all inspections with a citation have at least one
charge), along with the percentage of inspections where credential and registration citations were
issued. Given that nearly all of these inspections where prompted by credential or registration
FAIL codes, the percentage of inspections with citations can be viewed as a system success rate.
Citations were issued to the driver in 49 of the 72 inspections conducted during the blitz –
meaning 68.1 percent of the inspections resulted in at least one credentialing, registration or
related charge. Should this performance rate hold up over time, enforcement personnel could
expect to issue approximately two citations for every three inspections – assuming the system’s
FAIL code was tied to violation of a registration or credentialing rule. Looking at the inspections
by level, the success rate of the inspections is inverted compared to the success rate for safety
violations, which is as expected because the type of screening rule failure influences the type of
inspection performed by personnel. Level 3 inspections were generally performed when the
vehicle had a registration or credential violation, but no safety issues. In 84 percent of those
cases, a citation was issued, which indicates very efficient system performance.
Table 26. Charges and Citations by Inspection Level
Inspection Level

Violations/Charges

7

Inspections
w/Citations to Total
Inspections
3/17

Percent of
Inspections
w/Citations
17.5

1
2

5

4/5

80

3

53

42/50

84

Total

65

49/72

68.1
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Citations were issued for four of five Level 2 inspections, which translate to an 80 percent
success rate. The reason for this success rate is probably a function specific to each Level 2
inspection, which collectively form a very small sample. Level 1 inspections garnered the lowest
success rate for credential and registration violations with 17.5 percent, but a lower registration
and credential citation rate is expected for vehicles who are targeted for safety violations.
The composition of credential and registration violations flags and citations provides researchers,
transportation officials and enforcement personnel with information about the distribution of
credentialing and registration violations. The PARSS flagged 122 vehicles with 138 potential
credentialing and registration violations, meaning some vehicles had multiple FAIL flags. These
credentialing and registration flags and charges are presented in Table 27. Those flags, in order
of frequency were: UCR and KYU, Overweight, Expired Registration, Insurance, FOOS, IFTA,
and KY-for-Hire. Specific charges resulting from inspections, in order of frequency were: UCR,
KYU, Overweight, FOOS, Expired Registration, and IFTA. There were no citations issued for
Insurance or Ky-for-Hire during the blitz. Combined, UCR and KYU constituted 78 percent of
screening and credential flags, and 79 percent of all cited violations (or charges). Overweight
trucks comprise 8.7 percent of these screening flags. This particular number may be overstated
because the WIM sometimes miscalculates the weight of trucks, and static scale weigh-ins reveal
the truck is in fact running at a legal weight. Expired registration comes to 5.1 percent of the
registration and credential flags, but readers should be cautioned again that this data is not
always accurate and in several cases trucks with valid registrations were in fact incorrectly
characterized as violations. This problem is not due to a failure of the USDOTR and ALPR
equipment, but because several states do not provide comprehensive or up-to-date information to
the SAFER database. Insurance FAIL flags were issued on seven occasions. One violation
notice was recorded but no citations or charges were written during the enforcement blitz, so this
is not added to the official tally of citation charges. Precisely one IFTA flag and subsequent
charge were recorded. In both instances where the system alerted the enforcement detail of a
potential FOOS violation, the vehicle was pulled in, cited and put out of service. Both FOOS
vehicles belonged to the same carrier. There were also six miscellaneous violations that did not
violate any of the PARSS screening rules but could nonetheless be attributed directly to the
decision to inspect the vehicle and/or driver.14 Both the system flags and the enforcement flags
tell a similar story. UCR and KYU are by far the most prolific credentials violations. Overweight
trucks provide a significant source of system attention, even if they do not always result in a
citation. Other screening rules flags are less frequent, but no less significant in terms of
importance (particularly FOOS).

14

The miscellaneous citations were issued for seat belt law violations (2), driving with a suspended license (1),
possessing a license while a license was revoked (1), improper display of USDOT number and a driver’s logbook
citation (1).
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Table 27. Credentialing and Registration Flags and Charges
Screening Rule

Flags

% of
Flags

Charges

% of
Charges

UCR

54

39.1

27

41.5

KYU

54

39.1

24

36.9

Overweight

12

8.7

3

4.6

FOOS

2

1.4

2

3.1

Exp. Registration

7

5.1

2

3.1

IFTA

1

0.7

1

1.5

Insurance

7

5.1

1*

0.0

KY-for-Hire

1

0.7

0

0.0

Miscellaneous

N/A

N/A

6

9.2

Total

138

100.0

65

100.0

* Not technically a charge because no citation was issued
One could divide the number of charges by the number of flags to calculate a success rate for
each screening rule. However, this would be problematic for several reasons. First, some of the
flags may be based on incorrectly read USDOT numbers or license plate numbers. Second, not
all flagged vehicles were inspected because in many cases there were inspection station
backlogs, and several flagged vehicles had to be released. There are other problems specific to a
particular screening rule. Most of this would serve to downwardly bias the success rate statistics,
and make it difficult to draw any conclusions. Therefore, the ratios were not calculated.
4.5.1 Collections

The revenue-generating potential of PARSS is also quite significant. Collections at the January
30 registration and credentials blitz, and the March 6 combined safety, registration and
credentials blitz were significantly higher than what is typically generated on an average day.
The January 23 blitz generated $6,300 in fees, fines and taxes; the March 6 blitz generated
$7,280 in fees, fines and taxes. The two-day collection total comes to $13,580, which helps
KYTC and KSP-CVE cover the cost of providing both safety and credential-based enforcement.
Given the collections totaled $20,628.87 for FY 2011 at the Boone County inspection station, the
system has the potential to significantly increase collections at the Boone County station and
other inspection stations where PARSS is implemented. Annual collections will depend on how
many enforcement personnel are utilized at the Boone County inspection station, the amount of
time the station remains open, the ability of KYTC officials and KTC researchers to address data
quality issues with license plate data from other jurisdictions and the degree to which PARSS
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training is emphasized by KYTC and KSP-CVE. From a research perspective, more long-term
evaluation of the PARSS is needed so the financial benefit can be better quantified.

4.6 Conclusions
The systematic advantages of PARSS are numerous. During the March 6 blitz, detailed truck
counts were collected, and virtually every truck passing through the station was photographed
and screened. The system can also automate the vast majority of the WIM scale sorting decisions
for enforcement personnel. Figure 8 illustrates this process by showing how the screening results
translated into inspection results. The left-side legend shows how the PARSS categorized trucks
passing through the station, with the raw number of vehicles in parentheses.
Figure 8. Results and Inspection Results

Graphical representation of the 4,700 trucks passing through the station is shown in the orange
doughnut chart. The vast majority of vehicles (93 percent) going through the station were given a
PASS, WARNING or FAULT. The other seven percent were given FAILs. Most of those trucks
were not inspected due to station capacity and personnel limits. However, two percent of the
trucks (represented by the small blue sliver) were inspected. The arrow points from the FAIL,
Inspected category to a detailed breakdown of the inspection results, which are represented by
the blue doughnut graph. These categories are described by the right-side legend, with the raw
numbers in parentheses. Of the 72 inspections conducted, only 10 (or 14 percent) resulted in no
violations. More than half (58 percent) resulted in citations for credentialing or registration
violations. Roughly 18 percent of inspections revealed safety violations, and 10 percent resulted
in both safety violations and the issuance of a citation with credentials or registration charges.
This means approximately 86 percent of inspections resulted in a valid safety violation,
registration or credentialing citation, or both. It is also evident that commercial screening
performance can be significantly improved at inspection stations where the system is installed, as
the citation/violation rate for the Boone County PARSS compares quite favorable to the presystem citation/violation rate of 47.9 percent for FY 2011. The results demonstrate the system’s
most basic benefit – an automated screening process for virtually every truck passing through the
station and efficient identification of those carriers and vehicles most likely to have safety and
compliance problems. It enhances nighttime screening to a degree never possible when officers
and inspectors had only their eyes to identify and screen trucks without transponders. Most
importantly, it eliminates labor-intensive keying or screening based on instincts, and identifies
carriers with a high-probability of safety and compliance issues. The system does work best if
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someone can monitor the decoded character strings based on the camera images, but these
corrections require significantly less work than manually keying every truck coming through the
station.
The safety and compliance violations uncovered by the system were consequential. There were
62 safety violations, and 49 citations with 65 individual charges. As a result of the safety
violations, six vehicles and one driver were put out-of-service. There were also two trucks
detained because there were outstanding FOOS orders. The VOOS rate was 27.2 percent for the
March 6 blitz, and 43.8 percent during an earlier safety blitz on January 23. The average VOOS
rate for the two blitzes is 34.2 percent, which is well above the national average. As a result of
the credentials and registration citations, $7,280 in fees, fines and back taxes were collected.
Such outcomes may not be reflective of what users and researchers should expect out of the
system on a daily basis. Staffing levels are never as high as they are during enforcement details.
However, the potential of PARSS to augment safety and compliance screening performance
outcomes is quite significant, particularly as the screening systems proliferate to other inspection
stations across Kentucky. Given the collections totaled $20,628.87 for FY 2011 at the Boone
County inspection station, the system has the potential to significantly increase collections at the
Boone County station and other inspection stations where PARSS is implemented.
Ultimately, PARSS provides tangible benefits to every stakeholder in the truck screening
process. Enforcement officials reap the benefits of a highly specialized, automated ramp
screening system that employs the latest technology and best available screening data. FMCSA
benefits from enhanced safety screening. The increased VOOS rates and automated
identification of FOOS carriers are vital for keeping unsafe carriers off the roads and preventing
accidents, which cause substantial economic, environmental and human damage. FMCSA may
also indirectly benefit from the technology transfer and diffusion of screening processes outlined
in this report. The KYTC and transportation researchers benefit from safety and credentials and
registration results, as the increased collections help bolster Kentucky’s Road Fund and pay for
the state’s various surface transportation needs. Increased truck safety outcomes and revenue
collections could benefit other states where automated ramp screening systems are implemented.
The trucking industry benefits from increased safety and credentials compliance, as it reduces the
number of non-compliant carriers and levels the playing field for carriers who do follow the
statutory and regulatory requirements.
The system also has lots of potential for future research projects. As these systems expand
throughout Kentucky, researchers will investigate potential applications of other technologies,
including equipment that can read the KYU tax license number in the same manner as a USDOT
number. The state is in the process of building a centralized commercial vehicle inspection
database that will be searchable for every ramp screening system across the state. This database
will eventually be accessible at both fixed inspection stations and on laptops used by commercial
vehicle enforcement officers. The data will be updated in real time at the fixed stations and daily
downloads of canned data will be made available for use in enforcement vehicles without an
internet connection for roadside or virtual inspection station enforcement purposes. As time
progresses, research analysts will be able to investigate the impacts of these features as they are
implemented. Long-term studies can be designed using the centralized inspection database.
These studies can track system performance by examining the original reason the inspected
vehicle was flagged by the system and the outcome of each inspection. These large-n,
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quantitative studies will foster the development of predictive models that delineate the predicted
probabilities of safety, registration or credentials violations (i.e. the expected enforcement
outcomes). Estimates of safety benefits and collections outcomes for each PARSS installation
can also be derived. At the micro level, models can show analysts how likely an inspector is to
find a violation given a particular FAIL code by generating predicted probabilities. At the macro
level, these models will be used to determine how many accidents, injuries, fatalities, and
financial damage is mitigated by each system. Transportation researchers, commercial vehicle
enforcement officers, state and federal agencies, and the trucking industry will likewise benefit
from these future research endeavors.
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Chapter 5. Standards for Widespread Deployment
Standards for widespread deployment have been developed by KTC researchers and KYTC
officials, as the state intends to install more of these systems. This chapter briefly describes some
of the considerations made by researchers and officials as they prioritize where to implement
additional automated screening systems.

5.1 Station Designation
Kentucky currently has 14 fixed inspection stations, but not all of them have the same
equipment, personnel, physical characteristics, truck traffic, or strategic importance (e.g. on an
Interstate, at a port-of-entry, etc.). Some of the stations are characterized as “superstations” –
meaning they have a WIM sorting system, large parking lots for trucks which may or may not
include Truck Rest Havens, and larger inspection stations. Smaller stations have much shorter
ramps and do not have the ability to sort the truck traffic. As such, Kentucky’s “superstations”
are the best candidates for PARSS implementation. Those stations are as follows:










Laurel County Northbound (I-75) - PARSS already installed
Laurel County Southbound (I-75)
Scott County (I-75)
Simpson County (I-65)
Henderson County (U.S. 41)
Boone County (I-71) - PARSS already installed
Kenton County (I-75)
Lyon County EB (I-24)
Lyon County WB (I-24)

5.2 Ramp Length
Timing is crucial for the workings of an automated screening system, because of the need to
carefully calculate the placement of the screening cameras and loops in relation to the station so
that the truck pictures can be transmitted and screened before the truck reaches the split between
the bypass lane and the static scale lane. In the early stages of the deployment, vendors estimated
it would take ten seconds to acquire, decode, transmit, and screen the data, which would have
required posting much lower speed limits. HTS initially suggested that speed humps would need
to be installed in order to give the USDOTR enough time to acquire, decode, and transmit the
USDOT number to the inspection station. The technology has improved drastically in terms of
data transmission time, ALPR and USDOT accuracy, and system processing speed. The time
needed to take photos, screen trucks, and deliver a sort decision has been reduced to roughly four
seconds, which makes installation much less problematic. The Boone County inspection station
has a ramp length of 313 feet between the WIM scale and the split between the scale and bypass
lanes. Given the performance of the system, the distance between the WIM scale and the ramp
split could be established as a baseline. Stations with longer ramps between the WIM scale and
the ramp split could be fitted with an automated screening system. Since the weight data is the
last piece of information received by the system, stations with a shorter distance between the
WIM scale and the ramp split would require testing by research engineers and vendors to see
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whether the trucks can be screened in sufficient time to communicate the required course of
action to the driver.

5.3 Installation, Equipment and Maintenance Costs
Installation costs can vary greatly depending on station characteristics and layout. When
developing installation cost estimates, engineers must determine the costs of supplying power
and communications capabilities to the automated screening equipment, assess the condition and
location of the existing inductive loops, and assess the need and location for signs, guardrails and
other safety equipment. This requires identifying existing power and communications lines to see
how much, if any, trenching is needed to supply the necessary power and communications to the
equipment located alongside the ramp. In some cases several hundred feet of power or fiber optic
cable must be run in order to make the system functional. Wireless communication was
investigated, but a suitable wireless modem with sufficient bandwidth to send the images from
the ramp to the inspection station could not be found in 2010. Engineers will solicit bids from
contractors in order to complete the electrical and communications work.
Equipment costs are another component of this evaluation. Requests for bids are sent to vendors
who can supply the necessary technology and expertise to implement the ALPR and USDOTR
systems. The installation costs associated with each vendor’s product, along with its later
performance and maintenance costs, are evaluated in context of overall PRISM goals.
The ramp screening system requires a minimal amount of maintenance to ensure its
functionality. Quarterly visits are required to clean the equipment, check its condition, and
recalibrate it to ensure that it is operating at its fullest potential. These quarterly visits are only
needed to maintain the camera systems that provide the license plate image, USDOT image, and
the overhead image. The rest of the equipment comprising the system only requires maintenance
on an as needed basis. The in-ground induction loops do not require regular maintenance unless
the loop wire starts to become exposed and resealing becomes necessary. On-going maintenance
for this type of technology is extremely expensive and should be considered at the time of
installation.

5.4 Software Development
The original software for the Boone County inspection station was written by programmers at
Cadre5, but an updated version has been installed. The Kentucky CVISN team and KYTC’s
Office of Information Technology worked with ITERIS to develop the Kentucky Automated
Truck Screening (KATS) software and develop the observation database. The goal is to provide
a centralized database of all trucks observed at these facilities.

5.5 Conclusions/Lessons Learned
The use of OCR to automatically identify all vehicles within the weigh station for screening
purposes has proven to be very effective. The technology certainly has its shortcomings, but is a
good way to screen all commercial vehicles in the absence of a universal electronic identifier.
Perhaps the most compelling reason to utilize this technology for identifying vehicles is that it
does not require additional equipment on the vehicle. However, the technology would be more
effective if standards for the license plate and USDOT number were stricter.
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Throughout the course of this project, it became evident that the USDOTR system was a more
valuable screening tool than the ALPR system. This is because there is limited screening data
associated with the license plate, and what is available is often poor in quality. Canadian
provinces and several states are not currently uploading their vehicle data to SAFER. Of those
states that do upload vehicle-specific data, many have inaccurate information. This has surfaced
as KSP-CVE stops vehicles flagged with registration problems only to find their registration is
valid. The result is that these flags are often not utilized in order to minimize the number of
“false positives” from the system. It is also seen when the USDOT number associated with the
license plate in the database does not match the USDOT number identified with the USDOTR.
This may happen with an incorrect decode, but oftentimes this is a result of bad data within the
database. Without significant improvements with the vehicle-specific data, the registration flags
will quickly become of little use within these systems. On the other hand, data associated with
the USDOT number is available for all U.S. and Canadian carriers. So even though the
USDOTR may not perform as well as the ALPR system, there is more value in the screening that
occurs through the USDOT number.
As mentioned previously, there is opportunity to drastically improve the accuracy of USDOTR
systems through the strengthening of the federal regulation regarding the posting of the USDOT
number (49 CFR §390.21). The requirements are very “loose” with regard to the location,
contrast of the lettering to the background, and font size and style of the USDOT number. These
very things are the leading causes of failures associated with the USDOTR system in this study.
The location of the USDOT number may need to be specified within the regulation by its
distance from the first axle of the truck and the height from the ground. This would provide a
much narrower window for the USDOT number and would make locating the number much
simpler for a USDOTR system. The contrast between the lettering and the background has to be
significant in order for a USDOTR system to find the USDOT number. It may be necessary to
specific the color of the lettering and the background in order to ensure the contrast is sufficient.
The font style and size of the lettering should also be very specific. USDOTR system vendors
should be consulted when these changes are made to ensure the changes will make the USDOT
number more machine-readable.
Although the ALPR systems may not be as valuable to the screening process as the USDOTR,
they still provide value to the overall system. When the USDOTR is unable to get the USDOT
number (approximately 25 percent of the time), the ALPR may still allow screening to occur
through the license plate. The ALPR system also allows for vehicle-specific screening that
cannot be done with a USDOTR alone. As stated earlier, the vehicle-specific data needs
significant improvements, but can still provide some value if enforcement is willing to deal with
“false positives” from the system. Stricter requirements for the license plate would also improve
accuracy rates for this equipment. Kentucky currently does not require intrastate, single-unit
trucks to place their license plate on the front of the vehicle. A change to this requirement would
allow Kentucky to screen these vehicles as well. A unique plate string for each jurisdiction
would also improve the ability of the system to identify the jurisdiction. It was discovered
during the course of the evaluation that some states share a very similar, if not identical, plate
string. For instance, South Carolina and Illinois share the same format for their plate strings.
They both have the letter P followed by six numbers (P######). The only difference is that the
South Carolina plate has the jurisdiction on the top of the plate and apportioned at the bottom of
the plate, while the Illinois plate has the jurisdiction on the bottom of the plate and apportioned at
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the top. This creates confusion at times for the license plate reader and causes erroneous
screening results.
Purely from a volume perspective, the PRISM, DOOS, and VOOS flags were the most common
safety-related potential problems identified by the system. The UCR and KYU flags were the
most common credential-related potential problem identified by the system. However, some
screening elements were considered to be more valuable due to their ability to remove an unsafe
carrier from operation or to identify a legitimate credential problem. The flags deemed most
valuable by Kentucky were FOOS, VOOS, UCR, and KYU.
The thresholds for screening certain elements such as DOOS, VOOS, HOOS, and All OOS were
a moving target that took time to establish. These values were set to pull in trucks with OOS
rates much higher than the national averages for each category, but the exact values have been
tweaked over time to achieve the most desirable results. These values were adjusted by working
with KSP-CVE to find the thresholds that produced the best results. Since the evaluation, KSPCVE has identified an effective way to utilize the DOOS flag as well. Trucks with a DOOS flag
are sent to the static scale and enforcement staff takes a quick look at the driver’s log book. If
there are obvious problems, then the truck is stopped for inspection, if not, the driver is allowed
to proceed out of the station. This procedure has drastically improved the value of the DOOS
flag within the PARSS.
Collaborating with KSP-CVE proved to be very helpful in optimizing the PARSS. Valuable
feedback was received to enhance the newest software and suggestions for future enhancements
to the system. Many of the changes that have been made to the system during this time period are
a result of the officers and inspectors working with the system on a daily basis and providing
feedback about what needed to be changed. One of the suggested enhancements is to integrate
the PARSS with the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database and also look at trailer
license plates. Another suggestion was to make a change to the Mettler-Toledo sorting and
tracking system to provide the ability to hold commercial vehicles with certain potential
violations indefinitely. At the time of this report, vehicles are only held indefinitely if they are
overweight. Therefore, a vehicle with a FOOS order could be automatically released if they are
not manually directed to park or stop at the static scale.
Another lesson learned dealt with the importance of fresh data. Currently the system updates
once daily. This generally works well, but there are instances when a truck is stopped for a
potential violation and it is discovered that the violation had been corrected earlier that day. The
new software being developed will update the screening database every 15 minutes to eliminate
these types of problems.
The results of this study demonstrate the system’s most basic benefit – an automated screening
process for virtually every truck passing through the station, with efficient identification of those
carriers and vehicles most likely to have safety and compliance problems. Ultimately, the system
provides tangible benefits to every stakeholder in the truck screening process. Enforcement
officials reap the benefits of a highly specialized, automated ramp screening system that employs
the latest technology and best available screening data. FMCSA benefits from enhanced safety
screening. The increased VOOS rates and automated identification of FOOS carriers are vital for
keeping unsafe carriers off the roads and preventing crashes, thus reducing the associated
economic, environmental, and human damage. The KYTC benefit from safety, credentials, and
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registration results, as the increased collections help bolster Kentucky’s Road Fund and pay for
the state’s various surface transportation needs. The trucking industry benefits from increased
safety and credentials compliance, as it reduces the number of non-compliant carriers and levels
the playing field for carriers who do follow the statutory and regulatory requirements.
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